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FEDERAL COURTS:
ART. III(1), ART. I(8), ART. IV(3)(2), ART. II(2)/I(8)(3),
AND ART. II(1) ADJUDICATION
Laura K. Donohue, J.D., Ph.D. and Jeremy McCabe, J.D.*
ABSTRACT. The distinction among the several types of federal courts in the United States has gone almost
unremarked in the academic literature. Instead, attention focuses on Article III “constitutional” courts
with occasional discussion of how they differ from what are referred to as “non-constitutional” or
“legislative” courts. At best, these labels are misleading: all federal courts have a constitutional locus,
and most, but not all, federal courts are brought into being via legislation. The binary approach further
ignores the full range of federal courts, which are rooted in different constitutional provisions: Art. III(1),
Art. I(8); Art. IV(3); Art. II(2)/I(8)(3); and Art. II(1). These distinctions matter greatly in terms of defining
jurisdiction and understanding the scope of the authorities—and constitutional protections—that apply.
The failure of scholars to take into account the full panoply of the federal judicial system has contributed
to inaccurate analyses and cabined the debate. This article takes a significant step forward, providing a
conceptual, framework for each type of court and delineating, based on their legal and historical
underpinning, which adjudicatory bodies in the history of the United States fall within each category. It
details the constitutive elements of the courts and their jurisdiction as supported by doctrine, statutory law,
and scholarly literature, providing the first, comprehensive taxonomy of federal courts in the United States.

I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout U.S. history, entities created under Article III(1) have been referred to as
“constitutional courts.” What characterizes them is that they share “in the exercise of
the judicial power defined in [Art. III(2)], can be invested with no other jurisdiction,
and have judges who hold office during good behavior, with no power in Congress to
provide otherwise.”1 In contrast, certain tribunals that do not meet the Article III
requirements have been labelled “Article I,” “legislative”, or “non-constitutional”
courts. These institutions are understood to be “created by Congress in the exertion of
other powers,” with their functions directed to specific ends and their judges holding
office according to conditions set by Congress.2 While they may have some statutory
protections, adjudicators in Article I tribunals are not constitutionally protected from
removal during periods of good behavior; nor is their compensation guaranteed to
remain undiminished during their tenure.3
The epithets employed to describe these two types of entities are deeply misleading.
“Constitutional” (i.e., Article III) courts are not the only federal adjudicatory bodies
constitutionally-grounded: every federal court finds its locus in the constitutional text.
Nor are “legislative” (i.e., “Article I” courts) the only tribunals brought into being by
legislation. All inferior Article III courts are created by Congress. Numerous other
tribunals are rooted in Congress’s Article I(8) enumerated powers. Some courts
established by Congress, moreover, do not derive from Article I(8) enumerated powers
at all, instead finding their locus in Article IV(3). Yet other entities, such as courts of
occupation, have nothing to do with Congress but, under Article II, are constitutional
federal courts nonetheless.
*

Georgetown Law. Special thanks to Caitlin Chiaramonte, Kevin Jinks, Michel Paradis, Pete Pascucci,
David Vladeck, and Brian Wolfman for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929).
2 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (Van Devanter, J. Accord Williams v. United States, 289
U.S. 553, 563 (1933).
3 Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 449; Williams, 289 U.S. at 561, 581.
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The lack of precision has resulted in an inaccurate representation of what constitutes
the federal judicial system. Casebooks and treatises largely ignore dozens of federal
courts in existence.4 Even Hart and Wechsler, a canonical text, mentions just a handful
of non-Article III entities and sidesteps any discussion of their constitutional
underpinning.5 The lack of attention to the constituent parts of the system stunts our
understanding of constitutional law, the history of the judiciary, the relationship among
federal courts, and the extent—and limits—of their jurisdiction. It contributes to vague
and inaccurate assertions.6 And it fuels the cumbrous and narrow debate about the
legitimacy of assigning matters within the cases and controversies requirements of
Article III to Article I entities.7 Scholars’ failure to consider the full range of federal
4

See, e.g., MICHAEL FINCH ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: CONTEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS (3d ed. 2020)
(incorporating only one chapter on non-Article III courts); MICHAEL L. WELLS ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS (4th ed. 2019) (focusing almost entirely on Article III and the
relationship between federal and state courts, with only cursory mention of legislative courts and
administrative tribunals and no discussion of territorial courts, consular courts, military tribunals, or other
non-Article III entities); ARTHUR D. HELLMAN ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND THE LAWYERING PROCESS (4th ed. 2017) (defining “The Federal Judicial
System” entirely in terms of Article III); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: THE CURRENT QUESTIONS
(2017) (narrowly discussing Article III entities); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (6th ed.
2012) (adopting as its purpose “to state clearly the current law defining the jurisdiction of the federal
courts,” but then going on to focus solely on Article III); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT AND MARY KAY KANE,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (7th ed. 2011) (addressing just Article III courts and their relationship to
state courts); JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION (2d ed. 2011) (discussing only on
Article III entities); ROBERT A. CARP ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS (5th ed. 2010) (making only cursory
reference in the introductory chapter to “legislative courts” as entities created under Article I and omitting
any reference to territorial courts, consular courts, or courts of occupation); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL
COURTS 100-02, 118-31 (3d ed. 2009) (only one out of twelve chapters addressing “Non-Article III
Adjudicative Bodies” in which cursory reference is made to a few examples).
5 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 36-39 (7th ed. 2018) (very briefly mentioning Courts of the District of Columbia, territorial
courts, the tax court, the court of federal claims, the court of veterans appeals, and military tribunals).
6 See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS (5th ed. 2010) (collapsing administrative
tribunals and Article I(8) courts into the same category by suggesting that “legislative courts” often have
“administrative and quasilegislative as well as judicial duties” and briefly mentioning in the same
discussion the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as a specialized court created by Congress without
acknowledging it as an Article III entity); William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L.
REV. 1511, 1522, 1549, 1558 (2020) (overlooking consular courts and courts of occupation, both of
which exercise Article II power despite due process implications; referring to “so-called military courts”
as “not really courts in the constitutional sense;” and asserting “[b]ankruptcy courts, military courts, the
U.S. Tax Court, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims are not courts, in the constitutional sense.”); David
J. Bederman, Article II Courts, 44 MERCER L. REV. 825, 833-34 (1993) (overlooking the role of Article II
in the formation of consular courts); DAVID YANCEY THOMAS, A HISTORY OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN
NEWLY ACQUIRED TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES 317-18 (1904) (collapsing the extraterritorial court
that operated in the Panama Canal Zone under an Article II/I hybrid model with Article I(8) military
tribunals and referring to military commissions as “courts martial”).
7 For further discussion of the debate see, e.g., Baude, supra note 6 (distinguishing among certain courts
as exercising either the judicial or the executive power); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III
Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004) (arguing for an
inferior tribunal reading of Art. I(8)(9) to support the existence of both Article III and I entities); Craig A.
Stern, What’s a Constitution Among Friends?—Unbalancing Article III, 146 U. PA. L. REV.1043, 107374 (1998) (distinguishing between judicial and executive power to explain the Article III/Article I
divide); Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853,
887-892 (1990) (challenging the legitimacy of territorial courts and referring to Marshall’s decision in
Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) as “fatuous”); Paul M. Bator,
The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J.
233, 235-36 (1990) (arguing the existence of non-Article III courts as a matter of history and expediency,
not constitutional fidelity); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
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courts has led to inaccurate characterizations of what constitutes federal judicial power.
While some entities may have recourse to Article III entities as an appellate matter (and
thus carry “the judicial power of the United States”), not all of them do—nor need they,
as a constitutional matter, in order to exercise a judicial power.
This Article, accordingly, provides the first comprehensive account of the federal
judicial system, which includes general and specialized Article III(1) courts; specialized
Article I(8) enumerated powers courts; Article IV(3) territorial courts; Article
II(2)/I(8)(3) treaty-based courts; and Article II(1) courts of occupation. It defines and
distinguishes these from each other and from administrative tribunals, providing in the
process a robust account of the scope of the judiciary and demonstrating that the system
is far more complex than the simple binary approach that has hitherto marked scholarly
discussion. In so doing, it challenges existing theoretical constructs that mark the field.
Part II begins by detailing the eight Article III(1) courts that currently operate, five
of which have specialized subject matter jurisdiction.8 It recognizes numerous
specialized Article III courts that are no longer in existence and acknowledges that all
Article III(1) courts have inherent powers that stem from their duty to ensure fairness
and justice in the course of adjudication, their ability to efficiently manage their
resources, and their interest in protecting the integrity, independence, and reputation of
the courts as an institution.9 These powers do not depend on any statute. They arise from
the courts qua Article III entities. In recognition of separation of powers, those that go
to the core of the court acting in its judicial capacity are beyond the reach of either
Congress or the Executive Branch.
In Part III, we turn to specialized courts established under Congress’s Article I(8)
enumerated powers. While much has been made of the relationship between Article
I(8)(9), granting Congress the power to create tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court,
and Article III entities, almost no attention has been paid to the relationship of Article
I(8)(9) to the other elements of Article I(8) which provide further constitutional
grounding. Article I(8)(17) provides a locus for Courts of the District of Columbia (the

JUDICIAL POWER 36-39 (2d ed. 1990) (attacking territorial courts and arguing that military tribunals are
best considered as part of Article III); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 916 (1988) (embracing the appellate review theory);
Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983
DUKE L. J. 197 (presenting criteria for Article III versus administrative agency adjudication); David P.
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 646, 719 (1982) (critiquing Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in Canter as to the legitimacy
of a territorial court as “difficult to reconcile with the purposes of Article III” while sidestepping the
potential locus of Congressional authority as Article IV).
8 The five include the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review; the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
and the U.S. Court of International Trade.
9 For scholarly discussion of essential inherent powers, see Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common
Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008), Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts and
the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001), and Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory
Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984). To the extent that scholars disagree, it is in how broadly such powers
should be understood. Some say any action bearing a natural relation to the administration of justice falls
exclusively within the purview of the courts. See, e.g., Joseph J. Anclien, Broader Is Better: The Inherent
Powers of Federal Court, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 53 (2008); Linda Mullenix, Unconstitutional
Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1320-22
(1993).
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Superior Court and the Court of Appeals).10 In the military sphere, nine tribunals find
their homes in Articles I(8)(10), (11), (14), and (16). They divide into three categories:
the courts-martial system regulates servicemembers11; military commissions apply to
civilians and enemy combatants12; and veterans courts adjudicate retired
servicemembers’ benefits. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims and U.S. Tax Court both
derive from Article I(8)(1), with the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts and Bankruptcy Appellate
Panels as well as the (now defunct) citizenship courts from Article I(8)(4).13 Because
Article III powers do not extend to Article I tribunals, litigants in the latter have access
as of right to an Article III appellate court. 14
Article I is not the only source of Congressional power to constitute judicial entities.
Part IV, accordingly, turns to Article IV(3)(2), which provides for Congress “to dispose
of an make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States.”15 This clause provides independent authority for
adjudication of disputes outside of Article III—a power that has been conspicuously
overlooked in the effort to shoehorn federal courts into the “Article III or Article I”
nomenclature. Two categories mark this area: the first, incorporated territorial courts,
operated in nearly every state (outside of the original thirteen colonies), prior to
admission to the union; the second relates to unincorporated land, in which Congress
has established a number of parallel courts. The three currently in existence feed into
Article III(1).
Part V turns to treaty-based courts, which derive from Article II(2) coupled with
Congress’s commerce authority under Article I(8)(3). Unlike territorial courts, in regard
to which Congress acts as the first mover, courts in this category depend on the
Executive to negotiate international agreements, subsequent to which Congress acts
first to ratify the treaty and then to implement its requirements. Consular courts come
within this category, as do other entities established by Congress consistent with
diplomatic agreements, which are not housed in the country with whom the agreement
was reached. With a couple of exceptions (i.e., the U.S. Court of China and the Court
of Private Land Claims, which dealt with title to lands transferred to the United States
following the Mexican-American War), treaty-based courts have been insulated from
Article III(1) adjudication.
Part VI examines Article II courts of occupation and expansion, which the President
establishes in the context of war in occupied territories. Far from being a relic of the
past, at least four such courts operated in the twentieth century. None is supported by
legislation. Instead, they rely wholly on the President’s Article II(1) powers. In some
cases, these tribunals have acted as a forerunner to territorial courts established by
Congress under Article IV(3)(2). The divide into three categories: courts established in

10

The constitutional nexus for the Court is considered to be U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. But note that
the District of Columbia courts’ statuses have alternated over history. See discussion infra Part III.A.
11 See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S.
435, 436 (1987) (holding that trying a member of the Armed Forces under the UCMJ does not require the
offense charged to have a service connection).
12 See In re Khadr, 823 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Khadr v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1316
(C.M.C.R. 2014).
13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 8, 1, 4.
14 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 494-95 (2011).
15 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
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land acquired by the United States, courts established in response to armed rebellion,
and courts created in the context of war.
In Part VII, we briefly address administrative tribunals, which depart from
specialized Article I(8) courts by the degree of independence they have from the
Executive. Numerous such entities provide appeals of executive agency decisions or
themselves constitute independent, quasi-judicial agencies. Some examples include: the
U.S. Immigration Courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Board of Veterans’
Appeals, the U.S. International Trade Commission, the Social Security
Administration’s Appeal Council, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Election
Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board.
The final section, Part VIII, underscores that the federal judicial structure is far
more complex than is generally acknowledged. Accounts that narrowly focus on the
interplay between Article III and Article I(8)(9) miss the independent power of
Congress to establish adjudicatory bodies pursuant to its other authorities. Similarly
absent are considerations about other constitutional authorities that give rise to different
types of courts. Trying to justify the difference by according judicial power to territories
as a separate government may seem attractive, but it fails to account for the impact on
citizens’ rights. No more so does it explain treaty-based or consular courts, or even
courts of occupation. What does account for these entities is the fact that they are rooted
in different constitutional powers and part of an intricate system of adjudication.
II. THE JUDICIAL BRANCH: ARTICLE III(1) COURTS
Article III(1) provides for the judicial Power to be vested in the Supreme Court “and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” 16
Under this power, the legislature has established both non-specialized and specialized
Article III courts. Their status conveys certain inherent authorities that are
constitutionally-derived and indelibly linked to the courts’ status as a co-equal branch
of government. The fact that some of these courts are geographically-limited, or
established with particular subject-matter in mind, does nothing to divest them of their
Article III authority as the judicial power of the United States.
Once created, Article III courts “share in the exercise of judicial power defined in
[Article III].”17 All Article III judges are guaranteed life tenure, removal only for good
cause, and undiminished compensation.18 Unlike most state courts, all Article III Courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction.19 They have authority over nine categories of cases
and controversies, which divide into two general categories: the nature of the cause and
the character of the parties.20 The “judicial power” exercised in relation to them is “the
power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between
persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision.”21 Cabined by the
constitutional tenets, the meaning assigned to “cases” and “controversies” therefore at
once establishes federal jurisdiction and, along with the contours set by statute,

16

U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929).
18 Id.
19 See Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799).
20 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821).
21 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).
17
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determines the extent of the judicial power. The Supreme Court has, at times, read the
clause broadly to encompass cases that turn on a “federal ingredient.”22
A. Non-Specialized Geographic Courts
Non-specialized Article III courts are the courts one generally thinks of when
contemplating the “federal judiciary”: namely, the Supreme Court, Circuit Courts of
Appeals, the District Courts, and the (now defunct) Circuit Courts.23 Although all
federal courts have some level of specialization of subject matter, Congress granted
these courts (save the Supreme Court) with jurisdiction based on geographic location.24
The Supreme Court, subject to the case-or-controversy requirement, exercises
absolute authority over the U.S. Constitution, treaties, and federal statutory law. It
understands this requirement to mean that Article III courts may not issue advisory
opinions and the matter in question must satisfy standing and ripeness, not be moot, and
not present a “political question.”25 The Court also exercises jurisdiction over matters
involving federal common law, with due deference to comity and respect for state
authorities.26 Congress has assigned the Supreme Court original and exclusive
jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more states and original (but not
exclusive) jurisdiction of all actions in which ambassadors or public officials of foreign
states are party, all controversies between the states and the federal government, and all
actions by a state against citizens of another state or aliens.27 The Court has the authority
to review (by certiorari) all cases in the Courts of Appeal as well as all federal questions
decided via state courts of last resort.28 It has jurisdiction over decisions from the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals,29 the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico,30 and the supreme court of the Virgin Islands,31 as well as the specialized
Article III courts and certain decisions of the [Article I(8)] U.S. Court of Appeals for
22

See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824). Note, however, that to the extent
that Osborn is good law, it is because it is considered an expression of protective jurisdiction—i.e., a
reading of “arising under” to protect vital federal interest. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480, 492-93 (1983). After Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, however, the “ingredient” argument
has taken a back seat and the Court has in general taken a more restrained view of what constitutes a
claim “arising under” federal law. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53
(1908).
23 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2-4, 1 Stat. 73, 73-75; Judiciary Act of
1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826.
24 See Judiciary Act of 1789 §§ 9, 11-12, 1 Stat. at 76-77, 78-80 (district and circuit courts); Judiciary Act
of 1891 § 6, 26 Stat. at 828. While it is recognized that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has a different docket load than other regional circuits, we have included it within the non-specialized
sets of courts. See, e.g., Eric M. Fraser et al. The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 131 (2013) (discussing the Court’s unique workload resulting from the Court’s location, its
geographic coverage compared to other regional circuits, and Congress’s penchant for giving the Court
exclusive appellate jurisdiction in many different types of cases).
25 See Letter from the Supreme Court Justices to President George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793)
(establishing no advisory opinions); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)
(establishing political-question doctrine); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968) (acknowledging the
Article III “prohibition against advisory opinions”).
26 See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1874) (refraining from reviewing
state common law not as a matter of Constitutional jurisdiction but out of comity).
27 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West).
28 Id. §§ 1254(a), 1257.
29 Id. § 1257(b).
30 Id. § 1258.
31 Id. § 1260.
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the Armed Forces.32 Although originally established with one chief justice and five
associate justices appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,
under the Judiciary Act of 1869, the Court expanded to include its current number of
one chief justice and eight associate justices.33
The Courts of Appeal and District Courts serve as inferior, non-specialized and
geographically-limited courts.34 The former is constituted by 179 judges appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the senate.35 Like those on the Supreme
Court, they have life tenure and salary protection.36 They are divided into 12 regional
circuits,37 which encapsulate 91 district courts.38 The 663 judges appointed to the
District Courts have the same constitutional protections extended to the Supreme Court
and the Courts of Appeal.39
Two primary statutes establish subject matter jurisdiction for the District Courts,
granting them original jurisdiction over federal questions (i.e., “all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”) as well as disputes
between and among citizens of different states (i.e., diversity jurisdiction).40 Several
provisions detail jurisdiction of constitutionally-enumerated federal questions,41
provide additional bases for the suit authorized under Article III.42 Congress restricted
the ability of Article III courts to act on certain matters until they have first worked their
way through the state judicial domain.43
The (now defunct) Circuit Courts (1789-1912) were Article III courts that ran in
tandem with district courts. The Circuit Courts, which served as both trial courts and
had appellate jurisdiction, were created by the Judiciary Act of 1789. In 1891, the Court
of Appeals was established as an appellate court for district courts and circuit courts.44
B. Specialized Courts
Congress’s authority to create lower courts and to set their subject-matter
jurisdiction “necessarily implies the power to limit the jurisdiction of those Courts to
particular objects.”45 As with non-specialized and geographically-focused Article III
32

Id. § 1259.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73; Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44.
34 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 41, 43, §§ 81-132. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§
2-3, 1 Stat. 73, 73-74; Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826; District of Columbia Court
Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, 475.
35 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 44. Note that there are only 167 judges excluding the specialized Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.
36
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
37 See id.
38 See id. § 133. The district courts in Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands are not
included in 28 U.S.C.A. § 133 as they are courts established under Article IV of the Constitution.
39 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 133.
40 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1332.
41 See id. §§ 1330-1369.
42 See id. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). A district court having original jurisdiction over a civil
action shall have jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to the action as to form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III. Id. § 1367(a).
43 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (taxes by states); id. § 1342 (rate orders of state agencies).
44 Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. The circuit courts were abolished by the Judicial Code of
1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167.
45 United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812).
33
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courts, those with specialized subject-matter jurisdiction carry the judicial power of the
United States. The requirements of unity, supremacy, and inferiority having been met,
the judicial protections of good behavior and set compensation respected, and the case
or controversy requirement satisfied, such entities carry the full power of the third
branch of government. Scholars and the Courts agree that it is “uncontroversial that the
lower courts described in Article III, and created by Congress pursuant to Article I, § 8,
exercise the judicial power of the United States described in Article III, § 2.” 46
Accordingly, interference by the other branches in the core functioning of Article III
courts, of any type, violates separation of powers. There are currently six federal Article
III specialized courts. At least seven additional specialized courts have at one point been
brought into existence by Congress.47
1. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review
Two of the most prominent specialized Article III courts in existence are the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review (FISCR). Congress created them in 1978 to act as a neutral, third party
arbiter in approving the collection of domestic electronic surveillance undertaken for
foreign intelligence purposes.48 Their creation responded to public outcry at the extent
to which the intelligence community had placed U.S. citizens under surveillance, as
well as the Supreme Court’s determination that the executive could not engage in
electronic surveillance for domestic security purposes without some judicial process.49
Despite its in camera, ex parte emphasis and the absence of adversary parties, from the
beginning, Congress has consistently considered FISC/FISCR to be an Article III
court.50 Every court to confront the question has agreed.51
46

David A. Case, Article I Courts, Substantive Rights, and Remedies for Government Misconduct, 26 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 101, 104-05 (2005); see Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799); United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812).
47 The U.S. Customs Court, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Emergency Court of Appeals,
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, the Commerce Court, the Special Railroad Court, and the Court
of Claims.
48 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1885c).
49 See id. § 103(a), 92 Stat. at 1788; Intelligence Activities: Senate Resolution 21: Hearings Before the S.
Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intel. Activities of the U.S., 94th Cong.,
vol. 5, at 1 (1975); United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972). The law provides special
protections for United States persons. See 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801(h)(2), (4), 1802(a)(1)(B), 1821(4)(D),
1822(a)(1)(A)(ii).
50 Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H.
Permanent Select Comm. on Intel., 95th Cong. 26 (1978) (Letter from John M. Harmon, Assistant Att’y
Gen., to Rep. Edward P. Boland (Apr. 18, 1978), stating FISC/FISCR “will be Article III courts”); id. at
116 (FISC, comprised of “article III judge[s]” is to be independent “and in no way dependent on the
executive branch of Government”); id. at 184 (Letter from Sen. Edward M. Kennedy to the Rep. Robert
McClory (Feb. 10, 1978), stating that FISC is considered within “the constitutional jurisdiction of Article
III courts.”); see also id. at 213-16, 224 (discussions relating to whether the issues before the court would
meet Article III requirements as cases or controversies). It continues to do so. See 154 CONG. REC. 804
(2008) (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold, alluding to FISC as an Article III court with “inherent
power” over its own records and balking at the idea that the administration could “withhold FISA Court
opinions and documents that include significant interpretations of law”); see also id. at 809 (statement of
Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse); ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43746,
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CREATE FEDERAL COURTS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 6 (2014).
51 See, e.g., In re Certification of Questions of L. to the Foreign Intel. Ct. of Rev., No. FISCR 18-01,
GID.CA.00006, at 8, 2018 WL 2709456, at *4 (FISA Ct. Rev. Mar. 16, 2018) (per curiam); In Re Motion
for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486, GID.C.00021, at 3 (FISA Ct. 2007); In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d 717, 731-32, GID.CA.00001, at 731-32 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam); United States
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The role of the court has altered over time. Initially comprised of seven judges
selected by the Chief Justice from seven of the United States judicial circuits,52 FISC’s
job was to ascertain whether the government had met its burden of establishing probable
cause that the target was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and likely to
use the facility to be placed under surveillance, prior to issuing orders.53 FISCR,
comprised of three judges designated by the Chief Justice from the United States district
courts or courts of appeal, was fashioned to serve in an appellate fashion.54 In cases in
which FISCR denies an application, the Government could file a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court.55 In 1994, Congress extended FISC’s authority to
include ex parte orders for physical search.56 In 1998, it incorporated mechanisms for
pen register/trap and trace (PR/TT), as well as acquiring business records.57 These laws
are colloquially referred to as “Traditional FISA.” Under them, FISC initially
functioned as a warrant-granting body, issuing more than 14,000 orders and just one
opinion between 1978 and 2001.58 Applications were sealed and procedures conducted
in camera and ex parte.59
In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act made numerous changes to FISA.60 Although it
retained the size of FISCR at three judges, it expanded the number of FISC judges to
11, of whom at least three must reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia. 61
Congress expanded the business records provision to give the Court jurisdiction over
orders to require “the production of any tangible things (including books, records,
papers, documents, and other items).”62 Whereas before records could be sought only
from common carriers, public accommodation facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle
rental facilities, records now can be sought from any business or entity.63 In 2005, when
section 215 was set to expire, Congress added language requiring that the government
establish “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to

v. Cavanaugh, 807 F.2d 787, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal.
1985), aff’d, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986).
52 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 103(a), 92 Stat. at 1788.
53 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a); 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (1978) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
54 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(b).
55 Id. An electronic communication service provider receiving a directive under Title VII of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act may similarly seek certiorari in the Supreme Court. Id. § 1881a(i)(6)(B).
56 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 103-359, § 302(c), 108 Stat. 3423,
3445 (1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1822(c)).
57 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §§ 601-02, 112 Stat. 2396,
2404-12 (1998) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1841-1846, 1861-1864).
58 See FISA Annual Reports to Congress, 1979-2002, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FED’N AM.
SCIENTISTS, https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ (July 28, 2020); In re Application of the U.S. for an Ord.
Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises & Pers. Prop., GID.C.00001 (FISC Ct. June
11, 1981), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 97-280, at 16-19 (1981).
59 In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 488 & n.12, GID.C.00021, at 6 & n.12
(FISA Ct. 2007).
60 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. See, e.g., id.
§§ 206-208, 214-215, 218, 504, 1003, 115 Stat. at 282-83, 286-88, 291, 364-65, 392.
61 Id. § 208, 115 Stat. at 283.
62 Id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287.
63 Compare id. with Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602, 112
Stat. 2396, 2411 (1998).
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an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment)” prior to FISC granting an
order.64
In 2008, Congress further expanded the courts’ responsibilities, giving
FISC/FISCR oversight over the domestic collection of the communications of non-U.S.
persons, as well as U.S. persons, believed to be overseas.65 These changes, which
entailed oversight of acquisition, minimization, retention, and use of the information
obtained, heralded a significant shift in the court’s role: so-called “Modernized FISA”
ushered in an era of bulk and programmatic collection of citizens’ and non-U.S.
persons’ data.66 In light of new technologies, the government sought novel statutory and
doctrinal interpretations, forcing the FISC/FISCR to consider constitutional and
statutory limits and whether government action comported with the law.67
Beset by difficult questions, the courts’ roles have altered.68 Instead of just issuing
orders, the FISC/FISCR now routinely rule on critically-important First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendment questions.69 Their decisions impact separation of powers, common
64

USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 106, 120 Stat.
192, 196 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861).
65 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, sec. 101, §§ 702-704, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438-57.
66 See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations,
37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014); Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of
International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015); Laura K.
Donohue, The Case for Reforming Section 702 of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (June 26, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/report/case-reforming-section-702-us-foreignintelligence-surveillance-law.
67 As Presiding Judge John Bates explained on one such occasion, “The current application relies on [the]
prior framework, but also seeks to expand authorization in ways that test the limits of what the applicable
FISA provisions will bear.” Memorandum Opinion, [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED],
GID.C.00092, at 4 (FISA Ct.) (Bates, J.) [hereinafter Bates Mem. Op.]; see also Opinion and Order,
[REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], GID.C.00091, at 1-2 (FISA Ct.) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“This
application seeks authority for a much broader type of collection than other pen register/trap and trace
applications.”); Order, In re [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00016, at 12 & n.5 (FISA Ct.
May 31, 2007) (Vinson, J.) (arguing for collection not just to or from but also about a selector); Order
and Memorandum Opinion, In re [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00012, at 16 (FISA Ct.
Apr. 3, 2007) (Vinson, J.) (arguing an expanded understanding of “facility” and stating that the NSA
makes the probable cause finding for selectors); Primary Order, [REDACTED], No. PR/TT
[REDACTED], GID.C.00038 (FISA Ct.) (Walton, J.) (seeking bulk production of Internet metadata
using PR/TT); Supplemental Opinion and Amendment to Primary Order, [REDACTED], No.
[REDACTED], GID.C.00136, at 3-4 (FISA Ct.) (Bates, J.) (“Under the expansive interpretation of the
relevant statutory provisions put forward by the government, the limitations may not have been
warranted. But after careful consideration, the Court adopted a less expansive interpretation of the
statute.”)
68 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act §§ 206, 208, 214-215, 218, 504, 1003, 115 Stat. at 282, 283, 286-88,
291, 364-65, 392; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, § 106, Pub. L. No.
109-177, 120 Stat. 192, 196 (2006); Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552;
FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436; see also In re Directives to
Yahoo!, Inc. Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, No. 105B(g): 07-01,
GID.C.00025, at 3 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2008) (Walton, J.) (noting “the [Protect America Act of 2007] . . .
is hardly a model of legislative clarity or precision.”); Supplemental Opinion, In re Prod. of Tangible
Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13, GID.C.00033, at 2-3 (FISA Ct. Dec. 12, 2008) (Walton, J.)
(addressing tension between 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 and 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2702-2703).
69 See, e.g., Order and Memorandum Opinion, In re Proc. Required by Section 702(i) of the FISA
Amends. Act of 2008, No. Misc 08-01, GID.C.00028, 2008 WL 9487946 (FISA Ct. Aug. 27, 2008)
(McLaughlin, J.) (First and Fourth Amendments); Opinion on Motion for Disclosure of Prior Decisions,
[REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00112 (FISA Ct. 2014) (Collyer, J.) (Fifth Amendment);
Memorandum, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from
[REDACTED], No. BR 13-158, GID.C.00086 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013) (McLaughlin, J.) (First and
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law, and the rule of law. The Court examines complex matters of statutory
construction.70 And it monitors how the government wields its power.71 FISC/FISCR
opinions reveal the extent to which government actions comport with—or violate—
court directions and the law.72
An important and robust body of law is now emerging from a court that, for
decades, has been largely shielded from public inspection.73 Nearly 100 declassified
FISC/FISCR opinions and 300 orders are now in the public domain, as are hundreds of
FISC/FISCR filings. Non-specialized Article III courts, moreover, are increasingly
having to grapple with FISA and to integrate FISC jurisprudence into their decisions.
2. Alien Terrorist Removal Court
In 1987, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated what would become
a 20-year effort to deport seven Palestinian men and a Kenyan woman suspected of
being members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a radical wing of
the Palestine Liberation Organization.74 The L.A. Eight became emblematic of the
difficulties entailed in using classified evidence in deportation cases.75 In response, the
Reagan Administration proposed the creation of a special court to handle classified
evidence and removal of aliens.76 Similar to the FISC/FISCR, the new court would be
Fourth Amendments); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d717, GID.CA.00001 (FISA Ct. 2002) (Fourth
Amendment).
70 See, e.g., Supplemental Opinion, In re Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 08-13, GID.C.00033.
71 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00050, at 10-11 (FISA
Ct. 2009) (Hogan, J.).
72 See, e.g., Supplemental Opinion and Order, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the
Prod. of Tangible Things [REDACTED], No. BR 09-15, GID.C.00048, at 3-4 (FISA Ct. Nov. 5, 2009)
(Walton, J.) (NSA sent query results to email list of 189 analysts, “only 53 of whom had received the
required training”); Memorandum Opinion, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00073, at 15-18,
78-80 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) (Bates, J.) (NSA misled Court, violating FISA and the Fourth
Amendment); Bates Mem. Op., GID.C.00092, at 3, 18, 100-105 (“NSA exceeded the scope of authorized
acquisition continuously during the more than [REDACTED] years of acquisition”; FBI, CIA, and NCTC
“accessed unminimized U.S. person information”; NSA disseminated “reports containing U.S. person
information”; government requested permission to violate law); Memorandum Opinion, [REDACTED],
No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00078, at 26-27 (FISA Ct. Sept. 25, 2012) (NSA misrepresented upstream
collection, acquiring U.S. person domestic communications).
73 More than two decades after its 1981 opinion, the Court issued two opinions. In re Sealed Case, 310
F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002); In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intel.
Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, GID.C.00002 (FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed Case,
310 F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001. It published two more opinions between 2007 and 2008. In re Directives
[REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004,
GID.CA.00002 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484,
GID.C.00021 (FISA Ct. 2007).
74 Henry Weinstein, Final Two L.A. Defendants Cleared, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2007),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-nov-01-me-palestinian1-story.html.
75 The immigrants in that case had been distributing Al Hadaf, the Popular Front’s magazine, which was
also available in public libraries and the U.S. Library of Congress. Id. Initially charged under the
McCarthy-era McCarran-Walter Act (which had not been used since the 1950s), six of the non-U.S.
residents quickly had the charges dropped against them, with technical visa violations alleged in their
place. Phyllis Bennis, Ten Years of the Los Angeles Eight Deportation Case: Interview with David Cole,
MIDDLE E. REP., Winter 1997, at 41, 41; Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414,
66 Stat. 163. The two permanent U.S. residents were then charged with associating with an organization
advocating the destruction of property. Bennis, supra note 75.
76 Steven R. Valentine, Flaws Undermine Use of Alien Terrorist Removal Court,
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 22, 2002, at 1, 1, https://s3.us-east2.amazonaws.com/washlegal-uploads/upload/022202LBValentine.pdf (although the claim is not

11

comprised of sitting U.S. District Court judges selected by the Chief Justice.77 It was
not until the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
however, and passage of the 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, that
Congress created the specialized Article III court.78 Later in the year, further revisions
allowed for removal proceedings to proceed even where the court deemed the proposed
unclassified summary inadequate.79
The Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC) consists of 5 district court judges
appointed by the Chief Justice from 5 of the U.S. judicial circuits.80 Currently, four of
the five federal judges currently on the court are also members of the FISC.81 The judges
serve five year terms, are eligible for re-designation, and may be jointly appointed to
the FISC/FISCR.82 The court’s decisions are reviewable by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia and eligible for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.83
The Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General must certify the application with a
statement of the facts and circumstances relied on by the DOJ to establish probable
cause that an alien is an “alien terrorist” (as described in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(4)(B))
and physically present in the United States, and removal under the regular immigration
provisions would pose a risk to national security.84 Where these conditions are met, the
judge is required to issue an order granting the application.85 Denial must be
accompanied by a written statement of the reasons.86
Although the measures have been in place for nearly a quarter of a century, the
Attorney General has never applied to the ATRC to remove an alien terrorist, with the
result that the court has never conducted a proceeding.87 One theory as to why this is
the case highlights built-in procedural flaws: namely, that there is no other “recourse to
remove [lawful permanent residents] against whom the sole evidence of their terrorist
identity is FISA-obtained or derived from foreign intelligence information or is not

footnoted in the article, the author served from 1988 to 1993 in the Reagan and Bush Administrations as
the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Immigration Litigation in the U.S.
Department of Justice Civil Division).
77 Id. at 2.
78 Congress refused to hold hearings. See id. Following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Senator
Robert Smith (R-N.H.) proposed an amendment to the 1994 crime bill to establish the terrorist removal
court. Although a voice vote carried it, during the Senate Conference, the provision was dropped. Id. The
following year, Smith re-introduced it as a standalone bill. See Alien Terrorist Removal Act of 1995, S.
270, 104th Cong. (1995). Senator Joe Biden (D-Del.), on behalf of the Clinton Administration, similarly
introduced the Omnibus Counterterrorism bill, a bipartisan bill. Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995,
S. 390, 104th Cong. (1995). See also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, sec. 401, §§ 501-507, 110 Stat. 1214, 1258-68 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 15311537 (West)).
79
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 354, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009641 to 3009-644 (1996).
80 8 U.S.C.A. § 1532(a).
81 See Alien Terrorist Removal Courts: Judges¸ FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/alienterrorist-removal-court-judges (last visited Dec. 31, 2020); Current Membership – Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, U.S. FOREIGN INTEL. SURVEILLANCE CT., https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/currentmembership (last visited Dec. 31, 2020).
82 8 U.S.C.A. § 1532(a)-(b).
83 Id. § 1535.
84 Id. § 1533(a)(1)(D).
85 Id. § 1533(c)(2).
86 Id. § 1533(c)(3).
87 Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 1996-Present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/alienterrorist-removal-court-1996-present (last visited Oct. 18, 2020) (current as of 2018).
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appropriate for declassification or public acknowledgement.”88 While the statute
authorizes the use of FISA-derived information in the proceedings, where the court does
not approve of the government’s proposed unclassified summary of key evidence, the
court has to find two conditions: “(I) the continued presence of the alien in the United
States would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death
or serious bodily injury to any person, and (II) the provision of the summary would
likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious
bodily injury to any person.”89 Because the court must make both findings, the
government is left in the “same type of ‘Catch-22’ dilemma that justified the ATRC’s
creation” in the first place: i.e., “disclosing and risking sources and methods . . . versus
the removal alien terrorists.”90
3. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit91
Historically, federal district courts had exclusive jurisdiction over cases related to
federal patent law and copyrights.92 In the late 1970s and early 1980s though,
corporations, government attorneys, and academics convinced Congress that creating a
single appellate court for patent cases would help to create consistency and to relieve
the pressure on district courts for cases involving complex litigation and detailed
technical expertise.93 In 1982, Congress responded by creating the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, merging the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
and the appellate division of the U.S. Court of Claims.94 It consists of twelve judges
appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate.95
The Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in cases in which the district
court’s jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338. This includes: (a) civil actions
related to patents or plant variety protection; (b) certain appeals of claims against the
United States (c) appeals from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims; (d) appeals from
decisions of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office or the U.S. Court of International
Trade; and (e) review of certain agency decisions and appeals linked to particular
statutory authorities (e.g., § 211 of the 1970 Economic Stabilization Act, § 5 of the 1973
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, and § 506(c) of the Natural Gas Policy Act).96
The court also has jurisdiction over interlocutory decisions.97 Accordingly, one scholar
has proposed that the D.C. and Federal Circuits are more properly considered “semi-

88

Aram A. Gavoor & Timothy M. Belsan, The Forgotten FISA Court: Exploring the
Inactivity of the ATRC, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 139, 141-42 (2020).
89
8 U.S.C.A. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii).
90 Gavoor & Belsan, supra note 88, at 142.
91 The Court of Claims, one of the precursors to the Federal Circuit, is discussed infra text accompanying
notes 129-135. Further related history can be found infra Part III.C. discussing the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims.
92 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338.
93 See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 NYU L. REV.
1, 1-2, 6-7 (1989).
94 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
95 28 U.S.C.A. § 44.
96 Id. § 1295. The court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the inhabited territorial courts (i.e.,
Guam, the Virgin Islands and the North Mariana Islands, with the exception of matters related to the
subjects listed.
97 Id. § 1292.
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specialized,” as significant portions of their dockets deal with issues outside narrow
categories such as administrative and patent law.98
The court operates under a modified version of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, referred to as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Rules of
Practice.99 Although initially the Supreme Court allowed the Federal Circuit court to
operate fairly freely, in recent years it has begun to take a stronger stand, reversing a
number of the court’s decisions on substantive grounds.100 In 2017, for instance, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in seven cases, six of which it reversed in whole or
part.101
4. U.S. Court of International Trade
The U.S. Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over any civil
actions arising under certain sections of the 1930 Tariff Act, 1974 Trade Act, and the
1979 Trade Agreements Act; rulings issued by the Secretary of the Treasury related to
certain decisions impacting trade; any law providing for revenue from imports or
tonnage, tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on imports; and restrictions on imports.102
Congress created it in 1980 to reorganize the predecessor Customs Court. It consists of
nine judges (not more than 5 of whom can be from the same political party—a
requirement that raises constitutional concerns), appointed by the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate.103 The court, which is located in New York,
possesses “all the powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district
court of the United States.”104
5. Specialized Courts No Longer in Existence

98

John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two SemiSpecialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV 553, 553-55 (2010).
99 FED. CIR. R. (July 1, 2020), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-ofpractice/FederalCircuitRulesofPractice-July2020.pdf.
100 See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 322 (2015) (reversing the circuit’s
practice of considering findings of fact de novo); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
393-94 (2006) (rejecting a Federal Circuit application of a “general rule” unique to patent disputes
instead of using the traditional four-factor test for granting a permanent injunction).
101 See Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017) (consolidating Nos. 15-1039, 15-1195)
(focused on requirements under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 to provide
sponsor with a copy of the biologics license application and the sponsor’s recourse for failure to provide
that information); Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) (patent
exhaustion due to conditional and authorized sales); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), aff’g In re
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (constitutionality of disparaging marks provision of the
Lanham Act); Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734 (2017) (infringement liability for
worldwide sales under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) for supplying a single commodity component); SCA
Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017) (availability of
laches in patent infringement actions); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct.
1514 (2017) (patent venue).
102 28 U.S.C.A. § 1581. It also has exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions related to import commenced
by the United States, related counter-, cross-, and third-party claims, and civil actions under the United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) or the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Id. §§ 15821584.
103 Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727, 1727 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C.A. § 251).
104 28 U.S.C.A. § 1585.
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At least seven specialized Article III courts created by Congress no longer exist.
The first, the United States Customs Court, appears to have been an Article III court
based on the statute designating it as such in 1956.105 In 1980, the Customs Court was
replaced by the U.S. Court of International Trade.106
From 1909 to 1929, appeals from the Customs Court (and its predecessor Board of
U.S. General Appraisers) were made to the Court of Customs Appeals, an article I
tribunal.107 In 1929, Congress expanded jurisdiction to include patent and trademark
and changed the court’s name to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.108 29 years
later, Congress formally designated the court as established under Article III.109 In 1982,
this court’s functions were subsumed by the then newly created U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.110
During World War II, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942
to stabilize prices and prevent profiteering.111 It created the Emergency Court of
Appeals, comprised of three or more district or circuit judges selected by the Chief
Justice, with exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to regulations issued by the Office
of Price Administration.112 The statute empowered the chief judge (selected by the Chief
Justice) to divide the court into divisions of three or more judges to render judgment.
The court was granted “the powers of a district court with respect to the jurisdiction
conferred on it,” except the court was explicitly denied the authority “to issue any
temporary restraining order or interlocutory decree staying or restraining, in whole or
in part, the effectiveness” of certain regulations or orders.113 A petition for a writ of
certiorari could be filed in the Supreme Court within thirty days of a judgment or order
by the court.114 Although the court was created as part of a temporary measure, Congress
repeatedly renewed the authority, expanding its jurisdiction to include review of agency
decisions under the Housing and Rent Acts of 1948 and 1949 as well as Defense
Production Act.115 In 1961, the court heard its final case. It formally dissolved April 18,
1962.116
In 1971, Congress created a Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, again
consisting of three or more judges to be designated by the Chief Justice from the judges
of the district courts and circuit courts of appeals.117 Like the prior court, the temporary
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Act of July 14, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-703, 70 Stat. 532. Prior to that time, the U.S. Customs Court was
considered a legislative court. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 457-58 (1929).
106 Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727, 1727 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C.A. § 251).
107 See Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 29, 36 Stat. 11, 105; Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 457-58.
108 Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, § 1, 45 Stat. 1475, 1475.
109
Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-755, § 1, 72 Stat. 848, 848.
110 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
111 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 204, 56 Stat. 23, 31.
112 See id. §§ 204(a)-(c), 201, 56 Stat. at 31-32, 29.
113 Id. § 204(c), 56 Stat. at 32.
114 Id. § 204(d), 56 Stat. at 32.
115 See Housing and Rent Act of 1948, ch. 161, sec. 202(d), § 204(e)(4), 62 Stat. 93, 96; Housing and
Rent Act of 1949, ch. 42, sec. 203(d)(5), (e), § 204(e)(1), (e)(4)(E), 63 Stat. 18, 23-24; Defense
Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, §§ 407(d), 408, 64 Stat. 798, 808-11; see also Emergency Court of
Appeals, 1942-1962, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/emergency-court-appeals-19421962 (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
116 See Emergency Court of Appeals, supra note 115.
117 Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, sec. 2, § 211(b), 85 Stat. 743,
749.

15

one, which operated until 1993,118 served as an Article III court.119 Congress provided
it with circuit court powers relating to wage and price control programs, with some
exceptions.120
The controversial (and short-lived) Commerce Court (1910-1913) acted as an
Article III court as well.121 Largely a pet project of President William Howard Taft, the
Court had exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to orders issued by the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC). Appeal was via a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court. The Court consisted of five judges appointed for overlapping five-year terms.122
Upon their appointment, the first round of judges simultaneously received appointments
to different circuit courts of appeal, where they could hear cases as needed. At the
conclusion of their term, they continued to sit on the circuit court to which they had
been appointed, with replacements drawn from individuals already appointed to the
federal bench. Congress provided the Commerce Court with full powers of a circuit
court in regard to cases within its jurisdiction as well as the ability to “issue all writs
and process appropriate.”123 The first Chief Judge of the Court, Martin Knapp, had
previously served as chair of the ICC. He had a clear interest in keeping what he
perceived of as industrial control of the ICC in check. In reflection of this position, the
court went on to overturn a number of ICC decisions, which the Supreme Court
subsequently restored.124 Judge Robert W. Archbald’s impeachment in July 1912 for
using his position to secure railroad contracts for his cronies generated renewed
Congressional effort to abolish the court. Taft, however, vetoed the bill. Nevertheless,
the following year, with President Woodrow Wilson’s support, Congress eliminated the
tribunal.125
In the early 1970s, a number of railways in the midwest and northeast of the United
States filed for bankruptcy. Congress responded by passing the 1974 Regional Rail
Reorganization Act.126 The statute reorganized railroads into an economically viable
system, established the U.S. Railway Association and the Consolidated Rail
Corporation, and provided assistance to states and local and regional transportation
authorities to promote rail travel. It also established a special court, composed of three
federal judges assigned by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.127 The judges
were given the authority to exercise the powers of district court judges. In 1996,
Congress provided for the abolition of the Court under the Federal Courts Improvement
Act.128
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Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 102(d), 106 Stat. 4506, 4507.
See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc. in
Petroleum Antitrust Litig., M.D.L. 150, 830 F.2d 198, 202-04 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1987), Halleck v.
Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1251 (D.D.C. 1977).
120 Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971 § 211, 85 Stat. at 748-50; Spinetti v. Atl. Richfield
Co., 522 F.2d 1401, 1403.
121 Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 1, 36 Stat. 539, 539.
122 Id. at 540.
123 Id. at 541.
124 In four of the Court’s first five cases, it reversed ICC orders, and in each instance, the Supreme Court
restored the original ICC order. Dan Ernst, The U.S. Commerce Court, 1910-1913, LEGAL HIST. BLOG
(May 19, 2015), http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/the-us-commerce-court-1910-1913.html.
125 Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219.
126 Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (1974).
127 Id. § 209(b), 87 Stat. at 999-1000.
128 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, § 605, 110 Stat. 3847, 3858.
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The Court of Claims, established in 1855, initially operated as an administrative
body and, later, as an Article I tribunal.129 The originating statute directed the court to
hear and determine claims against the U.S. government, as well as claims referred to
the court by either the Senate or the House of Representatives.130 In 1863, Congress
authorized the court to render final judgments, from which an appeal could follow under
certain circumstances.131 In 1953, Congress declared that the Court of Claims was an
Article III court.132 Nine years later, the Supreme Court confirmed the court’s status
(along with the Courts of Customs and Patent Appeals), noting that because the judges
were constitutionally protected in regard to their tenure of office and undiminished
compensation, they were eligible to sit as Court of Appeals and U.S. District Court
judges.133 In 1982, however, Congress turned the tribunal back into an Article I Court.134
It continues to operate as such, subject to review in the (Article III) U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.135
C. Inherent Powers Central to Article III(1) Courts
The inherent powers of all Article III(1) courts are rooted in their constitutional
responsibility to administer justice and their status as the third branch of government.136
They divide into inherent powers that (1) ensure the judiciary can fulfill its obligation
to ensure fairness in the course of adjudication; (2) facilitate the efficient use of judicial
resources; and (3) protect the integrity, independence, and reputation of the courts.
Within each category, powers that go to the core of the courts operating in their
constitutional capacity (i.e., in the exercise of “the judicial power”) are considered
essential and thus beyond the reach of the other two branches. They are part and parcel
of the separation of powers that marks the federal system. Such authorities can be
distinguished from inherent powers that are merely beneficial, in which case Congress
may have some role to play in their demarcation.137
1. Ensure Fairness and Justice in the Course of Adjudication
Federal courts have certain inherent powers that enable them to fulfill their
substantive responsibility to ensure fairness and justice in the course of adjudication.
While Congress may act to facilitate the overall objective, certain authorities do not rely
on any legislative framing. To obtain equitable results, for instance, courts must be able
to obtain accurate facts. By extending their purview to cases in equity, Article III(2)
provides an underlying authority to do this—a power further recognized (but not solely
constructed) by Congress in the first Judiciary Act.138 Accordingly, Article III(1) courts
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Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612, 612. See infra Part III.C. for further discussion of the
Court of Claims and U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
130 10 Stat. at 612.
131 Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, §§ 3, 5, 12 Stat. 765, 765, 766.
132 Act of July 28, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-158, 67 Stat. 226.
133 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 569-71 (1962) (Harlan, J., plurality opinion).
134 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, sec. 105, § 171, 96 Stat. 25, 27
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 171 (West)); see also Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553,
581 (1933).
135 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 171(a), 1295(a)(3); see also Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-572, § 902(a), 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (assigning the name “United States Court of Federal Claims”).
136 See, e.g., In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) Michaelson v. United States ex. rel. Chicago, St. P.,
M. & O. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924); In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1993).
137 See supra note 9.
138 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 19, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
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can appoint auditors, special masters, and commissioners to make investigations.139
They can use discovery procedures in habeas cases.140 Article III judges can allow posttrial depositions.141 They can require the production of witness statements and parties
to attend hearings regarding missing evidence.142 They can make in limine rulings.143
Article III entities have inherent authority to exclude, admit, or strike evidence or
exhibits on grounds of fairness.144 They also have the inherent power to issue and
answer letters rogatory to obtain evidence from an individual within the jurisdiction of
a foreign court.145 This is done as a matter of parity between the judicial functions of
internationally-recognized governments.146
Pari passu, lower courts have recognized the judiciary’s power to ensure that
matters of law are addressed. For example, they can require parties to enter memoranda
of law.147 They can require counsel to serve standby.148 They can require parties to retain
a lawyer.149 They can assign attorneys for pretrial actions.150 And they can appoint amici
curiae.151 For the sake of consistency, courts have the power, derived from common
law, to ensure stare decisis as a matter of both horizontal and vertical parity.152
The courts have further inherent authorities related to the conduct of trials. They
can, for instance, withdraw a juror mid-trial where it would be “a total failure of justice
if the trial proceed.”153 They can fine jurors who try to leave without permission.154
They can discharge a jury from delivering a verdict.155 They can excise jury
determinations and order a reduction in an excessive verdict.156 Notably, nowhere can
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See Peterson, 253 U.S. at 304-07, 312-14 (1920); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (5th Cir.
1982), amended in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982); Schwimmer
v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir. 1956); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 127-29
(1864).
140 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290 (1969).
141 United States ex rel. Consol. Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Altech, Inc., 929 F.2d 1089, 1091-92 (5th Cir.
1991).
142 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957); Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1985).
143 Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984).
144 Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir. 1992); Walker v.
Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 712 (4th Cir. 1986); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co.,
585 F.2d 877, 897-98 (8th Cir. 1978).
145 In re Letter Rogatory from Just. Ct., Dist. of Montreal, Can., 523 F.2d 562, 564 (6th Cir. 1975) (“[I]t
has been held that federal courts have inherent power to issue and respond to letters rogatory.”) (citing
United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165, 173 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Staples, 256 F.2d 290, 292
(9th Cir. 1958); In re Pac. Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 256-57 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887)).
146 In re Letter Rogatory, 523 F.2d at 563 n.1 (quoting The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941)).
147
Alameda v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980).
148 United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1018 (3d Cir. 1993).
149 See J.D. Pharm. Distribs., Inc. v. Save-On Drugs & Cosmetics Corp., 893 F.2d 1201, 1208-09 (11th
Cir. 1990).
150 In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1977).
151 In re Utils. Power & Light Corp., 90 F.2d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1937).
152 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
153 United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622, 623 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 14,858).
154 Offutt v. Parrott, 18 F. Cas. 606, 607 (C.C.D.C. 1803) (No. 10,453) (fining a juror who jumped out a
window to try to escape jury service).
155 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
156 The first recorded use of remittitur was by Justice Joseph Story. See Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 762
(C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578); see also Barrett, supra note 9, at 829. Even though the rules provide for
the grant of a new trial, it remains a judicial power. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59.
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remittitur be found in statutory form.157 They can rescind a discharge order and recall
the jury for further deliberation.158 So, too, can they mediate the impact of common law
rules of procedure.159 These powers are not established by Congress. They are entirely
within the courts’ authority qua the judicial branch of government.
Article III(1) courts also have the (essential) power to make decisions that are not
subject to control by the other branches. When they act in this core judicial capacity,
separation of powers prevents the other branches from interfering. To give effect to
their determinations, this extends to the ability to control and review their decisions. If
it did not, the other branches could simply intervene after the fact effectively nullify
judicial decisionmaking by preventing it from reaching the public domain. As a
consequence, as the Supreme Court explained in Nixon v. Warner Communications,
“Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files.”160 They can seal,
unseal, revoke, or rescind orders.161 They can modify or lift protective orders.162 This
power persists even when jurisdiction over the relevant controversy has ended.163
Jurisdiction over the sealed record is not lost when the case is appealed.164
2. Facilitate the Efficient Use of Resources
In 1936, the Supreme Court recognized the inherent authority of the judiciary to
manage its affairs with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.165
In 2017, the Court reiterated its position, noting that the judiciary has the power,
conferred by neither rules nor statutes, “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”166 While dockets may in many
circumstances be mandatory (excepting, for instance, the certiorari process), Article III
courts control how that docket is handled.167
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Barrett, supra note 9, at 829. Remittur is constitutionally assigned to the Courts in their Article III(2)
grant of equitable authority. In contrast, additur, which is not an equitable remedy, has not been allowed
in federal court. See Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
158 Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1890 (2016).
159 See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933).
160 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). Accord Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377
F.3d 133, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 710
F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983).
161 Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1943); United States v.
Seugasala, 670 F. App’x 641, 641-42 (9th Cir. 2016) (mem.); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948,
983 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Mann, 829 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1987). This includes the
authority to revoke orders granting bail. Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642 (1961).
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In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Poliquin v. Garden Way,
Inc. 989 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[A] protective order, like any ongoing injunction, is always
subject to the inherent power of the district court to relax or terminate the order, even after judgment.”);
Gambale, 377 F.3d 133, 141 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 143-45).
163 United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (“As long as a
protective order remains in effect, the court that entered the order retains the power to modify it, even if
the underlying suit has been dismissed.”)
164 Seugasala, 670 F. App’x at 641.
165 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
166 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haegar, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R.,
370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)); see also In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 143 (1st Cir. 2002); Arthur
Pierson & Co., v. Provimi Veal Corp., 887 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1989).
167 Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1805, 1805 (1995)).
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Article III(1) courts can, for instance, demand that defense counsel commit to a date
for trial.168 They determine the order in which issues will be considered.169 They can
initiate proceedings by declaring parties ready for trial.170 They can consolidate
questions involving common law and fact171 as well as entire cases.172 Relatedly, they
can stay an action pending the completion of a related action in another court.173 Courts
can restrict pretrial hearing length.174 And they can implement a range of restrictions in
the conduct of trial, such as limits on the number of expert witnesses.175 They can
require parties to have representatives with settlement authority.176 They can limit the
amount of time counsel can speak.177 On similar grounds (and subject to appellate
review), courts on their own authority can dismiss an action on grounds of forum non
conveniens—despite the fact that a parallel authority has been established statutorily.
3. Protect the Integrity, Independence, and Reputation of the Judiciary
As their own branch of government Article III(I) courts also have the inherent power to
protect the integrity, independence, and reputation of the judiciary. Like matters that go
to the heart of adjudication, these authorities are protected, under separation of powers
doctrine, from interference by the other branches. The judiciary, for instance, has the
inherent authority to prevent fraud on the court. They can launch their own, independent
investigation.178 And they can set aside decisions if they are later found to be rooted in
fraudulent representation.179 This power is rooted in the extension of Supreme Court
jurisdiction to cases in equity under Article III(2). Along similar lines, Article III(1)
courts have the inherent authority to sanction contumacious behavior, such as failure to
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United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1998).
Marinechance Shipping, Ltd. v. Sebastian, 143 F.3d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1998).
170 See Williams v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 728 F.2d 730, 732 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984).
171 Bowen v. Chase, 94 U.S. 812, 824 (1876). This power was later acknowledged by statute. FED. R. CIV.
P. 42(a).
172 MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958).
173 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); La. Power &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-33
(1943); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
174 See J.S. Pharm. Distribs., Inc. v. Save-On Drugs & Cosmetics Corp., 893 F.2d 1201, 1209 (11th Cir.
1990).
175 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Guynes, 713 F.2d 1187, 1193 (5th Cir. 1983). But see United States v.
Colomb, 419 F.3d 292, 301-02 (5th Cir. 2005).
176 In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); see also In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397,
1407 (11th Cir. 1991); Luis C. Forteza e Hijos, Inc. v. Mills, 534 F.2d 415, 418-19 (1st Cir. 1976).
177 See United States v. Maloof, 205 F.3d 819, 828 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956,
964-65 (5th Cir. 1997); Sims v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 1996).
178 Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Refin. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
179 As the Supreme court explained, the “historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten
judgments” is central to judicial integrity because “tampering with the administration of justice in [this]
manner . . . involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set
up to protect and safe-guard the public.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Harford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,
245, 246 (1946)); see also Universal Oil Prods. Co, 328 U.S. at 580 (citing Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. 238;
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (quoting Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245, 246).
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prosecute.180 The judiciary can penalize parties for litigating in bad faith.181 The court
can fine an attorney when a party has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.”182 It goes to the court’s ability to ensure that its own operations are
regarded as just. It thus “transcends a court’s equitable power concerning relations
between the parties and reaches a court’s inherent power to police itself.”183 Even where
there are procedural rules in place, courts can impose sanctions under their inherent
powers.184 This includes sanctioning a party for “delaying or disrupting the litigation,
or by hampering enforcement of a court order.”185 And courts can go further: in some
circumstances, they can dismiss an appeal or complaint entirely.186
Contempt, too, falls within this category. Traditionally, it has been understood to
mean misconduct in the presence of the court, disobeying court orders, or misbehavior
by judicial officers. Despite considerable legislation governing this area, there are
numerous cases in which the Court has underscored its own, inherent authority, distinct
from the statutory basis.187 In 1821, the Court explained that Article III entities are
“universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose
silence, respect and decorum in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates,
and as a corollary to this proposition, to preserve themselves and their officers from the
approach and insults of pollution.”188 Certain “auxiliary and subordinate” powers can
be exercised by the courts where they are “indispensable to the attainment of the ends”
specified.189 In 1874, it wrote:
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently
to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States
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For example, in 1962, following repeated prosecutorial delays, the Court explained that its authority
“to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution [is] an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but
by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); see also
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31).
181 This is one of the ancient powers of the courts, which dates back (at least) to the early 17th century.
See An Acte to Reforme the Multitudes and Misdemeanors of Attorneyes and Sollicitors at Lawe, 3 Jac.
c. 7 (1605) (Eng.); 1 WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING’S BENCH, AND COMMON
PLEAS, IN PERSONAL ACTIONS, AND EJECTMENT 60-61 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 4th Am. ed. 1856).
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Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,
447 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1980); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haegar, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1183-84 (2017)
(holding that federal courts have inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct).
182 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (quoting F.D. Rich Co.
v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)). See also Pushaw, Jr., supra note 9,
at 765 (referring to sanctioning for contumacious behavior as a “comprehensive legislative sanctioning
scheme”).
183 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46.
184 Id. at 49-50.
185 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978).
186 See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976); In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556,
565-66 (6th Cir. 1995); D.P. Apparel Corp. v. Roadway Express, Inc., 736 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1984).
187 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (giving federal judges “discretion” to punish “by
fine or imprisonment . . . all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the court.”); United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); United States v. Duane, 25 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1801) (No. 14,997) (citing common law roots of judicial authority).
188 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821).
189 Id. at 225-26.
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were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they
became possessed of this power.190
Fifty years later, the Court reiterated its position, recognizing that it had a duty to punish
for contempt.191 Without the ability to enforce its orders, the Court could not function.
As it later explained, “The underlying concern that gave rise to the contempt power was
not . . . merely the disruption of court proceedings. Rather, it was disobedience to the
orders of the Judiciary, regardless of whether such disobedience interfered with the
conduct of trial.”192 They similarly can sanction attorneys for “willful disobedience of
a court order.”193 This authority goes to the essential power of Article III(1) entities as
the judicial branch of government.
The range of options available is broad: courts can appoint an attorney to prosecute
defendants for criminal contempt. They can levy the cost of litigation.194 They can bar
individuals disrupting a trial from the courtroom.195 Judges can require silence, respect,
and decorum in their presence.196 And they can influence bar admission and
discipline.197 While such power “ought to be exercised with great caution,” it is
nevertheless “incidental to all Courts.”198
III. ENUMERATED POWERS TRIBUNALS: ARTICLE I(8)
The earliest doctrinal distinction between Article III courts and Article I courts is said
to have come in 1828 with the Supreme Court’s decision in American Insurance Co. v.
Canter.199 In it, the Court had to determine the legal status of the Superior Court of
Florida, a territorial court established by Congress. It concluded that the legislature
could carve out a domain not subject to Article III. In his analysis, Chief Justice
Marshall underscored the fact that upon appointment to the territorial court, judges did
not enjoy life tenure. Instead, they held office for four years:
These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts, in which the judicial power
conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited.
They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative Courts, created in virtue
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Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874).
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925) (“[A] judge must have and exercise [powers of
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of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue
of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations,
respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with
which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in
the 3d article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution
of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the
United States.200
Although Article III reserved “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” to courts
established under its auspices, “the same limitation does not extend to the territories. In
legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general [i.e.,
federal], and . . . state government.”201 Legislative courts could therefore be
distinguished both by the constitutional protections extended to the judges, as well as
the type of power being exercised.
Marshall’s endorsement of the legitimacy of the Floridian territorial court in Canter
relied on the text of Article IV, as well as “the general right of sovereignty” residing in
government. Reference to this case as establishing the distinction between Article III
and “Article I” courts therefore can only amount to a shorthand way of saying that
territorial courts are brought into being by Congress. The authority underpinning their
creation derives from a different part of the Constitution. Nevertheless, Canter is
frequently cited in reference to the distinction between Article III courts and what are
referred to as “Article I”, “legislative”, or “non-constitutional” tribunals.
Certainly, there is an important distinction to be drawn: Article I tribunals cannot
exercise the judicial power of the United States, even as, under separation of powers
doctrine, the other branches cannot interfere in the inner workings of Article III entities.
Courts thus must at times delineate which entities fall into which category.202 In the
1864 case of Gordon v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the status of the
Court of Claims.203 Initially, Chief Justice Taney determined that because it was
essentially a legislative body, no appeal would lie from it to the Supreme Court.204
Taney died in 1864, before his decision issued.205 In 1865, the case was reargued. While
the decision was pending, Congress repealed the statutory language to which Taney had
pointed to deny jurisdiction.206 The Court, accordingly, shifted its position and claimed
jurisdiction over final judgments from the court.207
In the time that has elapsed since Gordon, Supreme Court authority over the rulings
of legislative courts has turned on the type of proceeding and the finality of the
judgment. The Court does not review administrative proceedings. But where legislative
courts exercise judicial proceedings, carry a final decision, and involve the exercise of
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Article III judicial functions, federal courts may have appellate jurisdiction.208 In the
2018 case Ortiz v. United States, for example, the Court reaffirmed that the military
justice system is essentially judicial in character.209 The rationale behind the Court’s
determination is that where Article III jurisdiction is being exercised, then Article III
protections are necessary.
The constitutional nexus for courts in this category lies in Article I(8)’s explicit
grant of powers to the legislature. Most prominently, Article I(8)(9) provides for
Congress “to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.” Two points here
deserve notice: first, as a substantive matter, the laws and types of issues to come before
entities created under Article I(8)(9) is cabined by the powers granted to the legislature
in Article I(8). These types of courts, accordingly, find root both in Article I(8)(9) and
in the other enumerated powers of Article I(8).
Second, the language of Article I(8)(9) departs in significant ways from Article
III(1), in which “the judicial power” may be vested “in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” To “ordain” is to order, or to
officially decree the status of something or someone. Thus, under Article III(1), it is up
to Congress to determine—i.e., to ordain—which courts are inferior to the Supreme
Court and thereby carry the judicial power. Congress thus creates and designates which
courts constitute the third branch. In contrast, the use of the word “tribunals” in Article
I(8)(9) suggests the power to constitute adjudicatory bodies that do not necessarily
exercise “the judicial power,” but which ultimately (because of their inferiority) fall
under Supreme Court jurisdiction.210 This power, then, is the heart of Congress’s
authority, as cabined by the substantive, enumerated powers, to create Article I(8) courts
wherein appeal is to Article III.
Consistent with this clause, Congress has acted under a number of its authorities to
constitute Article I(8)(9) tribunals. Under Article I(8)(17), which establishes
Congressional control over the territory in which the seat of government is located,
Congress has established courts in the District of Columbia.211 Other specialized Article
I(8)(9) tribunals focus on taxation,212 bankruptcy,213 post offices and roads,214 copyrights
and patents,215 and the constitution and governance of the military and militia.216 An
associated implied power relates to Congressional authority over immigration, under
which it has created immigration tribunals.217 Article I(8)(18) goes on to provide
residual power to constitute the tribunals in a manner consistent with what is necessary
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and proper to give effect to the substantive enumerated powers, as well as to bring the
tribunals themselves into operation.
A final point to make about Article I(8)(9) tribunals in contrast to other types of
federal courts is the temporal priority afforded to the legislature: Congress is the first
actor in bringing such tribunals into existence. In this sense, these entities differ from
the Article II(2)/I(8)(3) treaty bodies, which can best be understood in terms of hybrid
powers. In the latter case, the Executive acts in the first instance to reach international
agreement, as a necessary but not sufficient precondition to Congress acting on its
Commerce Clause authorities to bring such entities into being. See discussion, Part V,
infra. They are not thus properly solely creatures of the legislative branch. A brief
discussion of the enumerated courts follows.
A. District of Columbia: Article I(8)(17)
The status of the courts of the District of Columbia has alternated over time. A
series of decisions in the late 19th and early 20th century underscored the position of
the tribunals as legislative courts, established under Congress’s plenary power to govern
the District of Columbia.218 Congress could therefore assign them non-judicial
functions. For instance, the Supreme Court of the District (renamed in 1936 the District
Court of the United States for the District of Columbia)219 held revisory powers over
patent issues, with decisions binding on the Commissioner of Patents.220 It held similar
authority over public utilities commissions fixed rates,221 as the D.C. Court of Appeals
had over orders of the Federal Radio Commission.222
Although the U.S. Supreme Court had previously stated in dictum that the courts of
the District of Columbia were legislative (i.e., non-Article III) courts,223 in 1933 it held
that they were constitutional courts, exercising the full judicial power of the United
States when they adjudicated cases or controversies under Article III.224
Simultaneously, insofar as the courts carried non-judicial functions, they comported
with Congress’s U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 powers.225 The Supreme Court considered
Article III, § 1 as limiting these authorities only in regard to tenure and compensation,
but not in regard to vesting legislative and administrative powers in the courts. The
Court explained, “Congress has as much power to vest courts of the District with a
variety of jurisdiction and powers as a state Legislature has in conferring jurisdiction
on its courts.”226

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 468 (1930)
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894, 899-903 (1930).
219 Act of June 25, 1936, ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921.
220 Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 60 (1884).
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223 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
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(codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-101 (West 2019)).
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In 1970, Congress passed a statute that distinguished between Washington D.C.’s
Article III courts (the Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia), and Article
I courts (the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia).227 It assigned matters of local concern to the local court system,
in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals acted as the highest court. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was given jurisdiction of appeals
from judgments of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on matters related to
federal criminal law.228 Three years later, the Supreme Court upheld this distinction in
Palmore v. United States.229 The defendant, who had been convicted by the Superior
Court of D.C. of a felony in violation of the D.C. Code, argued that he had a
Constitutional right to be tried before an Article III judge. The Court disagreed:
[T]he requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where laws of national
applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper
circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress
to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and
warranting distinctive treatment.230
Article I(8)(17) included the authority to try local criminal cases before judges who did
not have life tenure or protections against an undiminished salary. Pari passu, state
courts, as well as territorial courts, could take on questions relating to federal law.
The current Superior Court of the District of Columbia is comprised of a chief judge
and 61 associate judges nominated by the President after recommendation from the
District of Columbia Judicial Nomination Commission.231 The commission operates by
releasing a notice of any judicial vacancy and then provides three names to the President
for each opening, one of which the President selects.232 That individual is then
confirmed by the Senate for terms of 15 years.233 The court has jurisdiction over any
civil action or other matter (at law or in equity) brought in D.C.234 It also has jurisdiction
over certain criminal matters, violations of the rules and regulations of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, certain child custody cases, the issuance of
warrants for arrest, search or seizure or electronic surveillance in connection with
crimes and offences committed within Washington, D.C., or for administrative
inspections linked to public health, safety, and welfare.235 It has subpoena authority and
contempt power.236 The court’s business is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as modified by the court. Any
changes, however, must be approved by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.237
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The court’s decisions are reviewable by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals,238 which is comprised of a chief justice and eight associate justices appointed
in the same manner and for the same period as judges of the Superior Court.239 Its
business is conducted according to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, with
whatever modifications the court makes to them.240 As the highest court for the District
of Columbia, the D.C. Court of Appeals is the equivalent of a state supreme court, with
its decisions reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court on matters of federal law.
B. Military
The use of military tribunals derives from English history in which the ability of
the Crown to constitute such tribunals transformed over time to a Parliamentary power.
Prior to the Glorious Revolution and establishment of the English Bill of Rights, the
Crown promulgated its own Articles of War, which established rules for the conduct of
the military and the procedures for trying their violation.241 An exercise of royal
prerogative, such rules issued at the start of hostilities and ceased operation thereafter.242
Martial law held no quarter in peacetime.243 In 1689, however, despite the defeat of
James II, a significant portion of the British army remained loyal to him. Parliament
passed its first Mutiny Act, reflecting both the constitutional principle forbidding
standing armies absent Parliamentary consent, and that, as a practical matter, the
contemporary instability required the keeping of forces “for the Safety of the Kingdome
for the Common Defence of the Protestant Religion and for the reduceing [sic] of
Ireland.”244 The legislation made desertion, mutiny, and sedition a crime.245 Thereafter,
in recognition of the prohibition against standing armies, Parliament annually renewed
the statute.246
The Crown continued to issue Articles of War in the context of active hostilities,
with the result that by the time of the American Revolution, a complex set of rules had
emerged.247 Colonial legislatures followed Britain’s lead by passing regulations for
disciplining their militias.248 In the colony of Virginia, the House of Burgesses lifted
language directly from the English statute, providing for courts-martial “to inflict
238
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corporal punishment, not extending to life or limb, on any soldier for immoralities,
misbehaviour, or neglect of duty.”249 The Massachusetts Bay code of military justice,
similarly adopted by Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and
South Carolina, reflected the British Code of 1765.250
At the drafting of the Constitution, the authority to form a military and to issue rules
for its operation transferred to Congress through Articles I(8)(10), (11), (14), and (16).
Nine Article I(8) courts currently in existence,251 and numerous courts over the course
of U.S. history, have been introduced under these authorities. They divide into three
categories, each of which has a distinct history, constitutional grounding, and appellate
structure: courts-martial, military commissions, and veterans’ benefits courts, each of
which is discussed below. Military tribunals can be further distinguished from the other
Article I(8) courts in that they depend for their execution (in part) upon the President’s
position of the Executive as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service
of the United States.”252
1. Courts-martial: Articles I(8)(14) and (16)
The first category of military tribunal regulates active servicemembers, ensuring
good order and discipline within the military.253 This is the traditional courts-martial
system, which Congress increasingly mirrors on the Article III system. It contains a
three-tiered structure: courts-martial, the four courts of criminal appeals, and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (the decisions of which are reviewable by the
U.S. Supreme Court).254
The system itself pre-dates the Constitution: in 1775, the Second Continental
Congress passed 69 Articles of War, establishing courts-martial to adjudicate their
violation.255 The rules drew extensively from the British Code of 1765 and the
corresponding Massachusetts Bay requirements for its militia.256 A year later, Congress
expanded the Articles.257 Further revisions occurred, the most notable of which being
the shift in 1786 from requiring 13 members on general courts-martial to five, and five
for special courts-martial to three.258 In 2016, the Military Justice Act expanded special
David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46 VA. J. INT’L L.
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257 JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S SCH., U.S. ARMY, THE BACKGROUND OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE 2 (1959), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/background-UCMJ.pdf.
258 Act of May 31, 1786, 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. 1774-1789, at 317-22
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904-37). See also WINTHROP, supra note 241, at 22-23.
249

28

courts-martial to four members, general courts-martial to eight, and 12 members for
capital cases.259
Courts-martial were held with regularity during the Revolutionary War and early
America.260 It was only natural that the Constitutional Convention went on to lodge the
authority to constitute such laws and tribunals in Congress, empowering it “[t]o make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” and “[t]o
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.”261 When the U.S.
Constitution came into effect, the First Congress adopted the Articles of War of 1776
to govern the Army.262 Soon thereafter, Congress passed a statute providing for
governance of the Navy, which similarly provided for courts-martial.263 In recognition
of the shift from the Articles of Confederation, in 1806 Congress formally enacted 101
Articles of War, which remained in force for the next seven decades.264
In 1857, the Supreme Court ruled that such tribunals are not subject to Article III
requirements.265 To the contrary, the relevant provisions
show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of
military and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized
nations; and that the power to do so is given without any connection between it
and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United
States; indeed, that the two powers are entirely independent of each other.266
The Civil War prompted numerous changes to the code.267 In 1874, Congress codified
the Articles of War.268
In 1916, Congress re-enacted the Articles of War, vesting the military tribunals with
the jurisdiction to try and to punish servicemembers for violations of both state and
federal law.269 They subsequently underwent numerous revisions. The 1920 Articles of
War, for instance, required the convening authority to appoint a defense counsel for
both special and general courts (although it did not need to be an attorney).270 Starting
in 1921, they were accompanied by a Manual for Courts-Martial, which detailed the
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procedural rules. Further amendments were made in 1937 and 1942, and in 1947 they
were made applicable to the Air Force.271
With a significant number of civilians having been drafted into the military, calls
for further changes resulted the following year in passage of the Elston Act, which, for
the first time, authorized warrant officers and enlisted men to serve as members of both
general and special courts-martial when the accused was enlisted.272 It strengthened the
prohibitions on compulsory self-incrimination.273 In addition, it expanded the authority
of the law member.274 The appellate bodies, in turn, were provided with broader
authority to examine evidence, witnesses, and questions of fact.
In 1950, largely in response to complaints from World War II servicemembers who
went on to serve in public office, Congress passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ),275 a comprehensive list of criminal offenses under military law and the
operational rules that govern courts-martial. The purpose behind its adoption was to
ensure a universal system for the armed forces, applicable during peacetime and war.
Over the ensuing years, Congress made various amendments to the UCMJ, with the
most sweeping changes following comprehensive examination of the UCMJ by the
Military Justice Review Group 2014-2015. In 2016, Congress modernized the
definitions for offenses, altered maximum penalties, created new offenses regarding
computers and new technologies, standardized courts-martial, streamlined the post-trial
process, and instituted other changes.276
Courts-martial are not standing courts. Convening authorities constitute each one
on an individual basis to address specific allegations against particular individuals. The
system has evolved to be a bottoms-up process, with the express intent of freeing it from
unlawful influence from above. Thus, while courts-martial technically may be
convened by the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the commander of a combatant
command, in practice, they are convened by the senior commander of an installation—
typically a general or flag officer.277 The members of courts-martial panels normally are
of the same rank or outrank the accused and are not “peers” in the sense of how that
term applies to civilian juries.278 Military judges are subject to the military chain of
command and do not have the protections of good behavior or compensation provided
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member from a voting member of the panel to that of a law officer, in which capacity the individual
served in a more judicial capacity. See JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S SCH., supra note 257, at 6.
276 See Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000, 2894; See also 2018
Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Exec. Order No. 13,825, 3 C.F.R. 325
(2019), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. § 801 (2018); Implementation of the Military Justice Act of 2016, Army
Directive 2018-28 (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18514_AD2018_28_w_Interim_r27_10_
FINAL.pdf.
277 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 822-824.
278 See id. § 825(e)(1).
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to Article III courts.279 The military judge who presides over a general or special courtmartial is a commissioned officer as well as a member of the bar of the highest court of
a State, and whom the Judge Advocate General certifies to qualify for duty.280
In 1969, the Supreme Court ruled that alleged offences had to be connected to the
defendant’s military service to be considered within military jurisdiction; however, in
1989 the Court reversed its earlier decision, making the UCMJ broadly applicable.281
To prosecute alleged violations, there are three types of courts-martial in each of the
armed forces: general, special, and summary.282 The Manual for Courts-Martial
establishes uniform rules of procedure that are similar to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.283 Decisions are reviewable by the relevant Court of Criminal Appeals,
constituted by not less than three appellate military judges.284 The Court has jurisdiction
over cases carrying the death penalty, dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or
midshipmen, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for 2 or more
years; confinement 6 months to 2 years directly appealed by the defendant; and any case
referred to the Court by the Judge Advocate General.285 There are currently four such
courts in operation: the Coast Guard, Air Force, Navy-Marine Corps, and Army Courts
of Criminal Appeals, each of which operates under its own procedures.286
The final and highest court within the courts-martial structure is the United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (USCAAF).287 A court of record, it has five
civilian judges appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,
each serving 15-year terms.288 Judges are removable for neglect of duty, misconduct, or
physical or mental disability.289 The Court has jurisdiction over cases in which the
sentence as affirmed by any military Court of Criminal Appeals extends to death, any
cases reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals which the Judge Advocate General
orders sent to the Court, and by granting of petitions after review by the Court of
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See id. § 826; Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1994). Although the U.S. Courts-Martial,
like the Military Courts of Appeals, are neither courts of record nor explicitly established under Article I,
the Supreme Court has stated that they are Article I courts. See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 166-67, 168 (stating
that the Military Courts of Criminal Appeals are Article I courts); id. at 166-67 (stating that the U.S.
Courts-Martial are Article I courts).
280 10 U.S.C.A. § 826(b).
281 See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272 (1969); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436
(1987).
282 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 817 (jurisdiction in general); id. § 818 (general courts-martial); id. § 819 (special
courts-martial); id. § 820 (summary courts-martial).
283 Rules for Courts-Martial, in MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES II-1 to II-206 (2019 ed.).
The MCM is reviewed annually. 32 C.F.R. § 152.1 (2019).
284 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 866, 862, 869, 864; 32 C.F.R. § 150.1 (2019). See United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S.
904, 912 (2009) (stating that Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA) and Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) are Article I tribunals). Previously called the Military Courts of
Review, in 1994 they were renamed to more clearly reflect the appellate judicial role of the tribunals. S.
REP. NO. 103-282, at 230 (1994); see H.R. REP. NO. 103-701, at 737-38 (1994) (Conf. Rep.).
285 See 32 C.F.R. § 150.2; 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 866(b), 869(d).
286 32 C.F.R. § 150.1. See Courts of Criminal Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, 32 C.F.R. pt. 150;
Joint Rules of Appellate Procedures for Courts of Criminal Appeals; United States Army Court of
Criminal Appeals Rules of Appellate Procedure; United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal
Appeals Rules of Appellate Procedure; United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals Rules of
Practice and Procedure; and, United States Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
287 10 U.S.C.A. § 941.
288 Id. §§ 941, 942(a)-(b)
289 Id. § 942(c).
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Criminal Appeals.290 It maintains its own procedures,291 with its decisions reviewable
by the Supreme Court.292
2. Military Commissions: Articles I(8)(10) and (11)
Unlike courts-martial, which are directed at ensuring discipline within the military,
military commissions apply to non-soldiers: i.e., enemy combatants and civilians in
times of war.293 Their purpose is to root out enemy spies, saboteurs, and provacateurs.
As a constitutional matter, commissions derive from Congress’s authority “To declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water”; and its power “To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed
on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”294 They thus carry with
them an imprimateur of international law—particularly, provisions related to the laws
of war.
According to the Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin, the history of military
commissions dates back to the Revolutionary War, when General George Washington
constituted a military tribunal to try a British officer, Major John André, for
espionage.295 The head of Britain’s Secret Service in America, André was caught while
out of uniform, conspiring with Benedict Arnold.296 Military commissions were
regularly convened during the Mexican-American War and Civil War.297 Similarly,
military commissions were established during the Indian Wars, Philippine Insurrection,
World War II, and post-9/11 military actions premised on the 2001 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force.298
In 1866, the Supreme Court determined that the use of military tribunals for
civilians, even during wartime, was unconstitutional as long as the civilian courts were
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Id. § 867(a).
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces Rules of Practice and Procedure.
292 10 U.S.C. § 867a.
293 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343
U.S. 341 (1952); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
294 U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cls. 11, 10.
295 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 & n.9 (citing Proceedings of a Board of General Officers Respecting Major
John André, Sept. 29, 1780 (Francis Bailey ed., Philadelphia 1780),
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N13491.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext. But see
Glazier, supra note 249, at 18-23 (arguing that the trial was an advisory opinion). Aside from André,
Washington also brought Thomas Shanks before a Board of General Officers to avoid a formal trial. See
id. at 22.
296 Glazier, supra note 249, at 18.
297 See, e.g., Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 n.10 (citing WINTHROP, supra note 241, at 832 n.66 (detailing
numerous military commissions established in the course of the Mexican War); Dep’t of the Pac., Gen.
Ord. No. 52 (June 27, 1865) (detailing the trial of T.E. Hogg and others during the Civil War by military
commission for “violations of the laws and usages of civilized war”); Dep’t of the E., Gen. Ord. No. 14
(Feb. 14, 1865) (trying John Y. Beall for “violation of the laws of war”); James Hamilton, Dep’t of the
Ohio, Gen. Ord. No. 153 (Sept. 18, 1863) (trying soldiers and officers from the Confederate Army for
“being secretly within the lines of the United States forces”)). See also Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 243 (1863).
298 See, e.g., Glazier, supra note 249249; Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: A Concise History, 101
AM. J. INT’L L. 35 (2007); Peter R. Mansoor, Guantanamo and the History of Military Commissions,
HOOVER INST. (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.hoover.org/research/guantanamo-and-history-militarycommissions.
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still in business.299 But where, as in Ex parte Quirin, Congress explicitly sanctions the
use of military commissions for offenses against the law of war, they operate.300 Such
was the determination of the Court again in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, when it ruled that
neither the Authorization for the Use of Military Force nor the Detainee Treatment Act
expanded the President’s power to convene military commissions.301 The Court’s
approach underscores that the authority to establish such courts relies not, narrowly, on
Article II, but on Congress’s Article I powers—demanding a statutory framing to meet
Constitutional requirements. In acting upon such authorization, the President further
relies on Article II commander-in-chief authorities.302
Military commissions are constituted by military officers and follow a different
appellate structure than courts-martial. The currently-operable U.S. Court of Military
Commission Review is a court of record consisting of one of more panels, each of which
is composed of appellate military judges assigned by the Secretary of Defense or
appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate.303 The Court has
jurisdiction to hear appeals from any military commission.304 It operates according to
its own rules of procedure.305 Its decisions are reviewable by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia and, thence, to the Supreme Court.306
3. Veterans Affairs: Article I(8)(14) and (16)
The final military court in existence is the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims, which, like courts-martial, is a federal court of record established pursuant to
Congress’s authority to make rules for the military. The court has exclusive jurisdiction
to review decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals relating to veterans’ claims
regarding benefits for service-related disabilities, survivor benefits, and other benefits
owed to servicemembers (e.g., funding for higher education, or waivers of debt).307 Its
decisions, in turn, are reviewable by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.308
The court is composed of at least three and not more than seven judges, appointed by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for terms of 15 years.309
C. Federal Claims: Article I(8)(1)
From the Founding of the United States until just before the Civil War, Congress
received and decided private claims against the United States through its committee
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See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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See, e.g., Proclamation No. 2561, PUB. PAPERS 296 (July 7, 1942) (citing both statutory law and the
commander-in-chief provisions).
303 10 U.S.C.A. § 950f (West); see also In re Khadr, 823 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (stating that the
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Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591.
304 10 U.S.C.A. § 950c.
305 United States Court of Military Commission Review Rules of Practice.
306 10 U.S.C.A. § 950g(a), (e).
307 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252.
308 Id. § 7292.
309 38 U.S.C.A. § 7253; see also id. §7251.
300

33

system and congressional entities, followed by private appropriations bills subject to
bicameralism and presentment. Addressing such concerns was part and parcel of the
political process. But the number of petitions rapidly grew: by 1838, the volume had
increased sixfold over those presented to the First Congress, making it impossible to
consider, much less dispose of, most grievances.310 As one scholar opined, “[b]y 1848,
the dissatisfaction had turned to crisis. For the first time, the legitimacy of the
‘legislative model’ [of redressing grievances] came under widespread political
attack.”311 With only one out of every 18 claimants petitions successfully passing the
House and Senate,312 the system was no longer merely expensive—it was unjust.
Accordingly, in 1855, Congress created the Court of Claims to hear certain matters,
while still retaining control over both the expenditure of all public money and the
authority to continue to hear individual grievances.313 Its role was to determine certain
claims against the federal government as well as claims referred by Congress.314 The
statute required the court to report back to Congress, which decided whether it would
pay the recommended judgment out of the public funds. Congress provided for the three
jurists to be appointed and to serve in office in a manner that echoed Article III:
nomination by the President, confirmation by the Senate, and tenure during good
behavior.315 The constitutional nexus for the creation of the tribunal was found in
Congress’s control over the power to pay the debts of the United States, as encapsulated
in Article I(8)(1), in concert with the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The structure failed to address the underlying problem. The number of unaddressed
grievances continued to increase.316 Further augmented by a flood of Civil War claims,
matters came to a head. In 1863, Congress therefore gave the court the power to issue
its own decisions, instead of merely reporting its determinations to the legislature. 317
The statute still required the Secretary of the Treasury to review the decisions and to
estimate the appropriation prior to any disbursement of funds.318
Two years later, in Gordon v. United States, the Supreme Court refused jurisdiction
over appeals from the court.319 No formal opinion accompanied the denial. Upon
becoming Chief Justice, though, Salmon P. Chase published one attributing it to the
provision according Treasury the power of review.320 It was within Congress’s power
to establish an entity to examine testimony and to determine the validity of claims. The
problem was trying to insert the Supreme Court into the process. The prospect of its
opinions being regulated by the executive or legislative branches raised separation of
powers concerns. In 1792, five of the six Supreme Court justices had rejected a similar
legislative structure in Hayburn’s Case—a point underscored the following year in
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312 See id.
313 See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
314 Id. § 1, 10 Stat. at 612.
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316 Shimomura, supra note 311, at 653.
317 See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, 12 Stat. 765.
318 Id. § 14, 12 Stat. 768.
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Chisolm v. Georgia when it determined that the Court could hear claims against states,
with their decision final (thus prompting the 11th Amendment).321
Within a year of the Court’s refusal of jurisdiction in Gordon v. United States,
Congress struck the offending provision from the statute.322 Thereafter, the Supreme
Court agreed to hear appeals from the Court of Claims.323 In 1886, the Court held that
“as the law now stands, appeals do lie to this court from the judgments of the court of
claims, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.”324 In 1887, Congress passed
legislation expanding the Court of Federal Claims’s jurisdiction to all claims except tort
and restricting what could go to Congress, making the court the primary venue for
monetary claims against the United States.325
Throughout this time, the court operated as an Article I(8) entity. In Williams v.
United States, it noted that what started as an administrative or advisory body had
evolved into a court exercising judicial power and capable of rendering final judgements
reviewable by the Supreme Court.326 There was no constitutional tension in maintaining
two parallel systems, with final appeal lodged in Article III: while Article III(2)(1)
extends the judicial power to “all” cases relating to certain areas, it omitted the word in
regard to controversies to which the United States shall be a party. This meant that cases
could start in Article I(8)(9) tribunals.
As Congress became more focused on matters of national and international concern
in the mid-20th century, the federal judiciary assumed the responsibility of determining
virtually all claims against the United States.327 Then, in 1953, as discussed in Part
II(B)(5), Congress declared the U.S. Court of Claims to be an Article III court.328 Six
years later, the Supreme Court confirmed the court’s status.329 In 1982, however,
Congress turned the tribunal back into an Article I Court.330 Currently, it thus operates
as an Article I court, subject to review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (itself an Article III court).331
See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1792) (five of the six Justices declining to hear the
claims and questioning the constitutionality of the Invalid Pensions Act of 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243,
whereby disabled veterans could apply for pensions to the U.S. Circuit Courts, with their decisions
subject to a stay by the Secretary of War pending further Congressional action); Chisolm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that Art. III(2) abrogated state sovereign immunity and provided for
the justiciability of suits between private citizens and states), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
While the latter case is most often understood as a matter of state versus federal power, Federalists at the
time were also concerned about its implications for transferring the responsibility for the allocation of
federal monies to the judiciary. See Shimomura, supra note 311, at 642-43.
322 Act of Mar. 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9.
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327 The claims court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States. See 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(a), 1491(b)(1) (West) (conferring concurrent jurisdiction on district courts and the
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328 Act of July 28, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-158, 67 Stat. 226.
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D. Taxes and Customs: Article I(8)(1)
Other legislative courts stem from so-called public rights, such as those related to
taxes, customs, and administration of public lands. The public rights distinction was
first identified by the Supreme Court in 1855. The Court explained,
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such
form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are
susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring
within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.
Equitable claims to land by the inhabitants of ceded territories form a striking
instance of such a class of cases.332
The U.S. Tax Court has nineteen members, appointed to 15-year terms by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.333 The court has limited subject matter
jurisdiction: it may only consider cases related to taxation.334
E. Bankruptcy: Article I(8)(4)
Although the U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the authority to establish
“uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,”335 for
much of the country’s history, Congress did not vest federal courts with jurisdiction
over bankruptcy. Three short-lived statutes marked the 19th century. In 1800, facing an
economic downturn, Congress defined what would constitute an act of bankruptcy and
provided for district court judges to appoint commissioners to oversee the discharge of
debts in the course of bankruptcy proceedings.336 Congress repealed the act in 1803.337
Nearly 40 years later, again facing an economic depression, Congress enacted a statute
that was to last only two years, during which time district courts held jurisdiction over
“all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy.”338 In 1867, Congress again waded into the
water, granting district courts original jurisdiction over bankruptcy, abandoning the
effort in 1878.339
It was not until 1898 that Congress was able to enact a lasting measure, at which
time it established referees, to be appointed by district judges, to oversee bankruptcy
cases and to exercise limited judicial responsibilities for matters referred by the district
court. 340 Subsequent amendments expanded the power accorded to the referees.341 As
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855).
26 U.S.C.A. § 7443.
334 See id. § 7442.
335 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
336 See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, §§ 1-2, Stat. 19, 19-22.
337 Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898
Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 323 (1999) (positing that the enactment and repeal of the 1800
act was in part due to a power struggle between Federalists and Jeffersonian Democrats).
338 Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 6, 5 Stat. 440, 445 (repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat.
614).
339 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 1, 14 Stat. 517, 517 (repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat.
99).
340 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 33-34, 38-39, 30 Stat. 544, 555, 555-56.
341 See Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840; Act of June 28, 1946, ch. 512, sec. 2, § 34, 60 Stat.
323, 324.
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the district courts became increasingly congested, as part of a broader reform effort, the
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, created by Congress,342
recommended that a separate set of subject-specific federal courts be created.343 The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 gave original jurisdiction for bankruptcy to the district
courts, creating a separate, adjunct court in each judicial district to exercise the
jurisdiction.344 The judges were to be appointed by the president and confirmed by the
Senate, with a term of office set at 14 years.345
In 1982, the Supreme Court declared the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to courts
constituted by judges without life tenure to be unconstitutional.346 Congress responded
by passing a new statute that conferred jurisdiction on the district courts and authorizing
them to refer all matters within that jurisdiction to the bankruptcy judges for the
district.347 The statute also changed the manner of appointment, giving the Courts of
Appeals the power to appoint judges.348
Additional amendments in 1986, 2004, and 2005 further shaped the structure.349
Currently, bankruptcy courts exist as a unit of the district court in which they reside.350
Judges are appointed by the courts of appeals of the circuit in which they are located
for a term of 14 years.351 Reflecting the need for a dedicated court to relieve the district
courts of the burden, there are currently 316 bankruptcy judges in the United States.352
The salary is set at 92 percent of a district court judge.353 They can be removed “only
for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability and only
by the judicial council of the circuit in which the judge’s official duty station is
located.”354 Each district court may provide that any or all cases under Title 11 be
assigned to a bankruptcy court.355
The decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy courts are reviewable by the U.S. district
courts or, where applicable, by a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.356 Such panels are
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composed of bankruptcy judges to hear appeals.357 Their decisions are reviewable by
the relevant circuit court of appeals.358
F. Citizenship: Article I(8)(4)
The Choctaw and Chikasaw Citizenship Court, created by Congress in 1902, also
operated as an Article I court.359 It came out of a series of statutes passed in the late 19th
century that focused on dividing and allocating land among the Cherokee, Chickasaw,
Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole nations.360 An act of Congress in 1893 established a
commission to negotiate the agreement.361 Named after its chair, Senator Henry Dawes
of Massachusetts, the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes (Dawes Commission)
accepted or rejected applicants for membership in the tribes based on whether the tribal
government had previously acknowledged their membership.362 It distinguished among
applicants as citizens by blood, citizens by marriage, minor citizens by blood, new born
citizens by blood, freedmen (formerly enslaved African Americans) new born
freedmen, and minor freedmen.363
Those who were unsuccessful at obtaining citizenship could appeal to the U.S.
Court for the Indian Territory, which in some cases granted the appeal without notice
to the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations.364 The nations objected, prompting Congress in
1902 to reach an accord with them whereby it created an Article I court.365 The President
appointed a chief judge and two associate judges, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate.366
The statute authorized the tribes to file a suit in this court, with ten named
defendants standing as those who had been admitted without notice.367 The law granted
the court appellate jurisdiction for citizenship determinations as reached by the U.S.
court in the Indian territory.368 The agreement also conferred “[e]xclusive jurisdiction
upon the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes to determine, under the direction of
the Secretary of the Interior, all matters relating to the allotment of land.”369 The court,
by agreement, was to terminate upon a final determination of the citizenship question,
but no later than the end of 1903—a deadline that Congress subsequently extended to
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the end of the following year.370 The court only operated less than seven months after
reaching a final determination in just one case.371
IV. TERRITORIAL COURTS: ARTICLE IV(3)
In 1781, the Articles of Confederation gave the national government (in Congress
assembled) the power to determine admission to the union.372 Three years later, the
Treaty of Paris brought a formal end to the Revolutionary War, ceding not just the
thirteen colonies (at that point, nascent states), but most of Britain’s possessions east of
the Mississippi River. The Northwest Ordinances of 1784, 1785, and 1787 reconstituted
this land as Northwest Territory, provided for its governance, and outlined the process
for state admission. By the time the Constitution was adopted, it was thus clear that
explicit authority had to be provided to govern such territories. Accordingly, Article
IV(3), gives Congress “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”373
As a constitutional matter, therefore, Congress possesses and exercises absolute
control over U.S. territories.374 In 1828, the question of the status of courts in the
territories came before the Supreme Court. As Part III of this Article noted, in this case
Marshall pinpointed the constitutional locus as Article IV, as well as the sovereign
authority of the United States.375 Just over two decades later, the Court again returned
to the status of the governance structure in the territories:

They are legislative governments, and their courts legislative courts, Congress,
in the exercise of its powers in the organization and government of the
Territories, combining the powers of both the Federal and State authorities.
There is but one system of government, or of laws operating within their limits,
as neither is subject to the constitutional provisions in respect to State and
Federal jurisdiction. They are not organized under the Constitution, nor subject
to its complex distribution of the powers of government, as the organic law;
but are the creations, exclusively, of the legislative department, and subject to
its supervision and control.376
While it is true that Congress brings such entities into being, they are not Article I courts
in a constitutional sense.377
Failure to acknowledge this aspect of territorial government has led to much
confusion, not least in determining to what extent other Constitutional provisions apply
to the territories. In the Insular Tariff Cases that marked the end of the 19th and early
20th centuries, the Supreme Court wrestled with how to understand governance of
noncontiguous territory. In one of the most prominent, Downes v. Bidwell, it concluded
370
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372 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XI (requiring the admission into the Union be agreed
to by nine states).
373 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
374 See Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336-337 (1810).
375 See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
376 Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 242.
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that a tariff imposed on goods imported from Puerto Rico did not violate Article I
constitutional provisions requiring uniform duties, imposts, and excises.378 Similarly, in
Dooley v. United States, the Court upheld the Foraker Act, requiring all merchandise to
Puerto Rico from the United States to carry a duty—despite the constitutional provision
in Article I forbidding any tax or duty on articles exported from any state.379 No clear
rationale dominated the Court’s determination. Gradually, through the doctrine of
territorial incorporation (which stemmed from Justice Edward White’s concurrence in
Downes), the application of Constitutional provisions became understood in terms of
whether the territories in question had become “incorporated into the union.”380
In its exercise of is power over the myriad territories acquired by the United States,
Congress has created at least four dozen separate territorial judicial systems. Every
single one of the attendant courts is a non-Article III (and non-Article I) entity.381
Consistent with the doctrine, we divide these tribunals into two categories: incorporated
and unincorporated territorial courts.
A. Incorporated
Outside of the original 13 states, as well as Kentucky, Vermont, Texas, California,
and West Virginia, every state in the continental U.S. came within an incorporated
territory prior to admission.382 In total, some thirty-one territories (or parts thereof)
eventually became states. In each case, Congress created superior and inferior federal
courts to execute territorial judicial power and to administer the law.383 The federal
legislature also determined which legal system would be administered. Where Congress
could not decide (for example, whether English, Canadian, Spanish, or Mexican rules
should apply), it provided territorial courts with jurisdiction over “criminal” and “civil”
cases and ensured that the pre-existing law would remain in force, to the extent that it
was compatible with the U.S. Constitution.384 Where Congress intended for the
adoption of the English system of law, in some cases it explicitly provided for superior
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Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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380 Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922).
381 See, e.g., id.; Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336-337 (1810); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S.
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Development of American Legal Institutions (pt. 2), 61 MICH. L. REV. 467, 467 (1963). In 1912 the last
state in the continental United States was admitted to the Union. Id.
383 See, e.g., Montana Organic Act of 1864, ch. 95, § 9, 13 Stat. 85, 88. For an excellent summary of
courts established in the territories prior to 1836, see William Wirt Blume & Elizabeth Gaspar Brown,
Territorial Courts and Law: Unifying Factors in the Development of American Legal Institutions (pt. 1),
61 MICH. L. REV. 39, 45-46 (1962).
384 Blume & Brown, supra note 382, at 518. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1805 ch. 23, § 1, 2 Stat. 322, 322
(giving inhabitants of the Orleans Territory “all the rights, privileges, and advantages secured by” the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787); Act of June 4, 1812, ch. 95, § 14, 2 Stat. 743, 747 (guaranteeing that
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judges to be granted common law jurisdiction.385 In others, it established that
inhabitants were “entitled” to judicial proceedings consistent with common law.386 At
times Congress gave superior judges both chancery and common law jurisdiction.387 In
one case (Alaska), Congress indicated that “The common law of England as adopted
and understood in the United States” would be in force.388
Despite such direction, considerable questions remained about what, precisely,
constituted common law—an issue addressed by subsequent territorial case law and
statutory provisions.389 Some looked to the common law of England and statutes that
supported it prior to 1607 (the rule of decision). Others considered the law as it existed
in 1776; still others looked to select British statutes.390 In all cases, the laws and system
of rules adopted had to be compatible with the U.S. Constitution.391 Congress also
granted territorial courts jurisdiction over other matters, such as probate (wills and
conveyances of land); divorce; admiralty; and bankruptcy.392 The rules of procedure
varied. In 1800, for instance, the General Assembly of Northwest required judges of the
General Court “to compile a system of rules for the government of the general and
circuit courts.”393 In other regions, the highest court in the territory established the
equivalent rules.394 Although the U.S. Supreme Court determined in 1863 that a
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See, e.g., Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a) (conferring common law jurisdiction on
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Stat. 172, 1776 (Washington); Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, §§ 9, 27, 10 Stat. 277, 280, 286 (Nebraska
and Kansas); Act of Feb. 28, 1861, ch. 59, § 9, 12 Stat. 172, 174 (Colorado); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 83,
§ 9, 12 Stat. 209, 212 (Nevada); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 86, § 9, 12 Stat. 239, 242 (Dakota); Act of Mar.
3, 1863, ch. 117, § 9, 12 Stat. 808, 811 (Idaho); Act of May 26, 1864, ch. 95, § 9, 13 Stat. 85, 88
(Montana); Act of July 25, 1868, ch. 235, § 9, 15 Stat. 178, 181 (Wyoming); Act of May 2, 1890, ch.
182, § 9, 26 Stat. 81, 85 (Oklahoma).
388 Alaska Criminal Code, ch. 429, 30 Stat. 1253, 1285 (1899). See also Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 7,
23 Stat. 24, 25 (1884) (general laws of Oregon declared to be enforce within the Alaska judicial district).
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See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648, 652, 656-57 (1873) (ruling on the
intermingling of legal and equitable remedies under common law). For a thoughtful discussion of the
integration of law into the territories, see William Wirt Blume, Legislation on the American Frontier:
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390 See generally Blume & Brown, supra note 382, at 477-523; Blume, supra note 389, at 333-48.
391 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 2935, at 523 (1887); Alaska Civil Code, ch. 786, tit. III, § 367, 31 Stat.
321, 494, 552 (1900); see also Blume & Brown, supra note 382, at 510, 514 (quoting the aforementioned
statutes).
392 Blume & Brown, supra note 383, at 59-71.
393 Blume & Brown, supra note 382, at 475 (quoting 1 STATUTES OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN
TERRITORY ch. 141, § 9, at 307 (Salmon P. Chase ed., Cincinnati, Corey & Fairbank 1833)).
394 See id. (referencing A DIGEST OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN
(Detroit, Sheldon & Reed 1821)).
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territorial court sitting in chancery was governed by the same rules governing Article
III entities, in 1874 the Court reversed course.395
With the exception of some early judges, for whom Congress guaranteed office
during good behavior, territorial judges were appointed for limited terms and removable
by the President at will.396 For the territorial governments constructed along the lines of
the Northwest Ordinance, at least three judges appointed by the President constituted
the highest court in each territory, with jurisdiction over both state-type and federaltype cases.397 After 1836, Congress largely standardized its approach.398 In cases
concerning the United States (and later, cases involving certain amounts), federal law
provided for appeal to Article III courts.399 The U.S. Supreme Court generally acted as
the highest court of appeal.400
Once statehood was achieved, territorial courts ceased operating and were replaced
by Article III entities. But as long as the territory itself was the dominant government,
there was no question: the courts did not constitute the judicial branch of the federal
government.401 One way, therefore, to think about territorial courts collectively is as
“coextensive with and correspondent to [the jurisdiction] of the State courts”—i.e., an
entirely “different jurisdiction from that exercised by the Circuit and District Courts of
the United States.”402 Since 1959, there have not been any incorporated (organized)
territories.403
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B. Unincorporated
Unincorporated territories describe regions where the U.S. Constitution has not
been fully incorporated. While fundamental rights are guaranteed, other provisions are
inapplicable. The Panama Canal provides a special case in that the tribunal established
there grew out of a statutorily-based territorial governance structure but was eventually
incorporated into the Fifth Circuit. It thus more closely resembles the current territorial
courts in existence, of which there are three.
The Panama Canal Zone provided a home for one of the first unincorporated territorial
courts. The 1902 Spooner Act authorized the President to purchase the rights and
property of the (French) New Panama Canal Company and to secure “perpetual control
of a strip of land, the territory of the Republic of Colombia, not less than six miles in
width, extending from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean” and the right to build a
canal and to maintain and operate the Panama Railroad in perpetuity.404 Should
Columbia not concede, the President was to negotiate the same from Costa Rica and
Nicaragua.405 The statute created an Isthmian Canal Commission, with seven members
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate to govern the
region and oversee construction of the canal, “subject to the direction and control of the
President.”406 Although the Senate ratified the treaty, the Colombian congress rejected
it.407
When the Republic of Panama declared its independence in 1903, the U.S. landed
marines and informed Colombia that it would not allow trade to be jeopardized.408 It
recognized the new government and drafted a new treaty which, in return for
guaranteeing Panama’s independence, conveyed a ten miles wide zone to the sovereign
control of the United States.409 It further granted a monopoly in perpetuity for canals
and railways across the territory. Both governments ratified the agreement. General W.
Davis, the first governor, appointed a judge to exercise judicial authority.410
For its first decade or so, governance was under direct control of the President. In
1912, however, Congress assumed more direct control, establishing civil government
and directing that the current laws would remain in effect only until Congress should
provide otherwise.411 It recognized “[t]he existing courts established in the Canal Zone
by Executive order” and continued them in operation until the courts provided for in
the statute were established.412 It also established a District Court for the Canal Zone,
with decisions appealable to the Fifth Circuit.413 In 1914, by authorities vested in this
Act, President Woodrow Wilson issued an Executive Order abolishing the prior
structure and, consistent with legislative provisions directed at wartime, placed the
canal under the control of the Secretary of War.414 Two months later, he issued a second
404
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Executive Order formally establishing the U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone.415
Replacing the Supreme Court of the Canal Zone, the District Court had original and
appellate jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters. In 1933, the court transferred to
the U.S. Department of Justice.416 The court thereafter operated until the return of the
zone to Panama in 1982.417
Cuba, Philippines, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, and Palau provide further examples of former U.S. territories that have
since become independent. Currently, there are thirteen insular (unincorporated) areas,
only five of which (Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto
Rico, and American Samoa) are inhabited, and only three of which have territorial
courts.418
Guam, one of the Mariana Islands, was ceded by Spain to the United States in
1899.419 In 1950, Congress passed a statute giving the protectorate a significant amount
of local autonomy.420 The District Court of Guam has the same jurisdiction of a regular
federal District Court (including, but not limited to, diversity jurisdiction), as well as
that of a bankruptcy court.421 The District Court of Guam has original jurisdiction in all
other causes in Guam to the extent that the legislature has not vested it in another
court.422 Decisions are reviewable by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.423 Judges,
appointed by the President to ten year terms, are removable for cause and accorded a
salary commensurate with that of a district court judge.424 The court supplements the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with Civil Local Rules of Practice (CVLR).
The District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands is part of the same judicial
circuit as Guam.425 Granted a similar scope for its jurisdiction, the court is made up of
just one judge, appointed by the President for a ten-year term.426 Like the District Court
of Guam, appeal is to the Ninth Circuit.427 Both the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit
and the Chief Justice may assign additional, temporary judges to the court.428
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Congress similarly vested the judicial power of the Virgin Islands in a district court
and such appellate and lower courts as are created by local law.429 The local legislature
has the authority to grant them jurisdiction over any matters in which the federal courts
lack exclusive jurisdiction.430 Congress explicitly provided the court with diversity
jurisdiction as well as that of a bankruptcy court in the United States, and exclusive
jurisdiction over all criminal and civil proceedings in the Virgin Islands in regard to the
applicable income tax laws.431 The district court has concurrent jurisdiction with local
courts over criminal offences.432 Its decisions are reviewable by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.433 The President appoints two judges to the court for 10
year terms, the longer serving of whom serves as chief judge of the court.434 The salary
rate is set to that of a district court judge.435 In the event that the case load becomes
untenable, the chief judge of the Third Judicial Circuit may assign a circuit judge or a
recalled senior judge from the islands to temporarily serve on the court.436
Although Congress previously created a territorial court for Puerto Rico, its status
has now shifted to that of an Article III entity. In its initial design, the court had one
judge in office for a four-year term.437 In 1915, Congress provided for appeals from the
court to go to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.438 Nevertheless, as recognized by the
Supreme Court shortly thereafter, the Court continued to function in its Article IV
status:
created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under Article
4, § 3 [of the Constitution], of making all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its
jurisdiction to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to
nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not
change its character as a mere territorial court.439
In 1938, Congress doubled judges’ length of tenure on the court to eight years.440 In
1966, Congress re-constituted it as a full Article III entity, with now seven judges
granted life tenure during good behavior.441
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The final unincorporated inhabited territory, American Samoa, does not have a
federal court. Matters related to federal law instead go to U.S. district courts in Hawaii
or the District of Columbia. 442
V. TREATY-BASED COURTS: ARTICLES II(2)/I(8)(3) HYBRIDS
Another category of federal court finds its origins in Article II, which grants the
executive the authority “to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur” and to “appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.”443 The
power to negotiate is construed broadly and reflects long-established diplomatic
practice—including providing for the establishment of federal courts overseas. As the
Supreme Court explained in the 19th century, “[t]he treaty-making power vested in our
government extends to all proper subjects of negotiation with foreign governments. It
can, equally with any of the former or present governments of Europe, make treaties
providing for the exercise of judicial authority in other countries by its officers
appointed to reside therein.”444 Accordingly, citizens’ rights overseas, and the extent to
which foreign nationals’ domestic law is applied through such courts, are set by formal
international agreement. So, too, are tribunals related to citizens’ rights outside the
United States when set against those of other countries.
Treaties are necessary but not sufficient for establishing extraterritorial courts. They
depend equally upon foreign nationals’ domestic law for the relevant tribunal to be
brought into existence.445 In the U.S. context, all such treaties would have to be
supported by Congressional statute.446 While the status of self-executing versus nonself-executing treaties is a complex area of the law, a central consideration is whether
Congress needs to create legal authority for carrying out the functions and obligations
in the agreement or making them enforceable in a U.S. court.447 Consular courts, as well
as tribunals related to slavery and international land claims, fall within this category.
A. Consular Courts
From the earliest days of the Republic, it has been understood that when a treaty
addresses an area constitutionally assigned to Congress, it cannot be used to bypass the
legislature.448 Thus, lower courts have found that treaty provisions which implicate
revenue or expenditures require legislative action to be given effect.449 In 1929, the
Supreme Court ruled that Congress, in creating consular courts, was acting under its
commerce clause authorities.450 It had done so since the early days of the Republic.
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In 1792, for instance, the Second Congress passed a statute consistent with a treaty
between the United States and France, giving U.S. district court judges the authority to
hear cases related to shipwrecked French vessels off the coast of the United States. 451
U.S. consuls and vice-consuls overseas were given the right of receiving any protests
or declarations of captains, masters, crews, passengers, and merchants (as were U.S.
citizens) abroad, as well as any claims from foreign persons against U.S. citizens. 452
Consuls could issue decrees carrying the force of law, as would such decisions “in all
courts in the United States.”453 They could manage the estates of U.S. persons who died
either at sea or within their consulate.454 For their work, consuls were to be paid
according to a set rate of compensation.455 These duties were “not be construed to the
exclusion of others, resulting from the nature of their appointments, or any treaty or
convention under which they may act.”456 In 1803 and 1840, Congress passed two more
statutes, detailing further powers and responsibilities.457
The system continued to develop in piecemeal fashion, with the President making
consular appointments in an ad hoc manner. The number of consulates rapidly
proliferated: by 1846, there were 175 consulates and commercial agencies abroad, plus
three consuls to the Barbary States (in Tangiers, Tunis, and Tripoli).458 These officers
tended to operate in a manner that furthered the personal interests of those in office,
rather than those of the United States.459 In light of the sheer numbers, the annual
expenditures, and the lack of respect afforded by other countries to the consuls’
positions, James Buchanan, U.S. Secretary of State, called on Congress to reform the
system.460
In 1848, Congress thus passed a fourth statute, setting out in a detailed and
comprehensive manner, the responsibilities and judicial functions of foreign ministers
and consuls.461 Again at the urging of the U.S. Secretary of State, just over a decade
later, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations considered a new bill to carry certain
aspects of treaties with several countries into effect.462 In 1866, Congress adopted a
broader statute encompassing more States, which was further amended in 1870, 1874,
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and 1876.463 These laws enabled U.S. consuls in China, Japan, Siam, Egypt,
Madagascar, Turkey, Abyssinia, Persia, Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco, Muscat, the Samoan
Islands, and other countries with similar treaties in place to assume judicial functions.464
In 1832, for example, a treaty between the United States and the Ottoman Empire
provided,
If litigations and disputes should arise between the subjects of the Sublime Porte
and the citizens of the United States, the parties shall not be heard, nor shall
judgment be pronounced unless the American Dragoman be present. Causes in
which the sum may exceed five hundred piastres, shall be submitted to the
Sublime Porte, to be decided according to the laws of equity and justice.
Citizens of the United States of America, quietly pursuing their commerce, and
not being charged or convicted of any crime or offence, shall not be molested;
and even when they have committed some offence . . . they shall be tried by
their Minister or Consul, and punished according to their offence.”465
Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the treaty, along with custom and
usage under the capitulatory regime in Egypt and in the former Ottoman Empire, and
“the laws of the United States enacted to give effect to the treaties of the United States
by virtue of which the United States was granted extraterritorial jurisdiction,” formed
the basis for subsequent American consular courts in Egypt.466
Under the relevant statutes establishing consular courts, ministers and consuls were
provided with judicial authority,467 which extended in criminal matters to trying and
punishing citizens accused of offenses against U.S. law,468 and for civil matters, to “all
controversies between citizens of the United States, or others” insofar as is limited by
the language of the governing treaty.469 Jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with
U.S. law, or, where unsuitable or deficient, with “the common law, and the law of equity
and admiralty.”470 With the exception of the U.S. Court of China (discussed, below),
the judges did not enjoy tenure in office. If insufficient, ministers could make decrees
or regulations with the force of law, with the consuls signifying their agreement or
disagreement with the regulations in writing. Statutory law empowered the minister to
publish the regulation, along with advice received, and to transmit the regulation to the
Secretary of State “to be laid before Congress for revision.”471
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Like Article III courts, all consular courts have been courts of limited jurisdiction.472
They are limited to consular business inside their district.473 Traditionally, their
functions have included legalizing acts of foreign judicial or other functionaries;
authenticating citizens’ marriages, births, and deaths while outside the United States;
reclaiming deserters and providing for destitute sailors; receiving protests of masters of
vessels; and administering the personal property of deceased citizens.474 For serious or
complex matters carrying fines above $500 or terms of imprisonment above 60 days,
the consul must summon up to four citizens to participate in the adjudicatory process.475
In capital cases, the decision had to be unanimous. The judicial authority provided to
consuls and ministers has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.476
At times, Congress has acted to put consular courts on a more robust constitutional
footing, building appeal into the Article III judicial branch. The U.S. Court for China,
for instance, served as a District Court with extraterritorial jurisdiction over U.S.
citizens in China. It arose out of the Treaty of Wangxia, a diplomatic agreement between
the Qing dynasty and the United States in 1844, which established that U.S. citizens in
China were exempt from the authority of local courts and subject, instead, to U.S.
law.477 In 1860, Congress passed another statute to carry into effect a new treaty signed
with China in 1858, as well as similar treaties made with Japan, Siam, Persia, and
elsewhere.478 These agreements essentially formed the basis of a consular court for U.S.
persons located in China.
The court operated under U.S. law and adjudicated associated matters. But,
following numerous complaints, in 1906 Congress created the United States Court for
China.479 It extended jurisdiction to all criminal cases carrying a punishment in excess
of $100 fine or 60 days’ imprisonment, and civil cases involving claims of more than
$500.480 The court served as the appellate court for the remaining consular cases and
could also hear appeals from the consular court in Korea.481 Appeal from the court was
first to the Ninth Circuit (District Court and then to the Circuit Court), and thence to the
Supreme Court.482
The jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of China, both original and on appeal, in civil and
criminal matters, was to “in all cases be exercised in conformity with said treaties and
the laws of the United States.”483 Where deficient, “common law and the law as
established by the decisions of the courts of the United States” applied.484 The judges
of the court and the district of attorney were appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, with a fixed compensation set by statute.485 The tenure
472
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of office was for 10 years, with removal prior to that time by the President for cause.486
The structure of the court reflected that of an ordinary District Court, replete with a
Presidentially-appointed District Attorney, Marshal, and Clerk.487 The court was based
in Shanghai and had sessions in Canton, Tientsin, and Hankau.488
Along with the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium,
Switzerland, Norway, Brazil, Denmark, and Sweden held extraterritorial rights in
China.489 Only the United States and Great Britain, however, had independent,
autonomous courts.490 In every case, the threshold question for judicial proceedings was
the citizenship of the defendant, for while any plaintiff could raise an issue, as long as
the defendant was a national of the country in question, they had the right to proceedings
in their own consular court.491 In 1921, the court ruled that the U.S. Constitution did not
apply in China.492 As a practical matter, this meant no trial by jury, although, according
to a judge on the court, “the Bill of Rights was otherwise scrupulously respected as a
matter of primary American principle and legal policy.”493
The act creating the United States Court of China was not without its critics—
including the Secretary of State Elihu Root, who roundly denounced it.494 Not least
among the concerns was the difficulty of determining what constituted “the laws of the
United States,” as referenced in the governing statutes.495 Congress, moreover, provided
the tribunal with jurisdiction in all cases where jurisdiction had previously been
exercised by consuls and ministers. Where consular legislation fell short, the court was
to look to “the common law as established by the decisions of the courts of the United
States.”496 With 45 sovereign states at the time, plus some territories, it was difficult to
say precisely what this meant, and it mattered: most of the court’s proceedings focused
on criminal matters, issues related to commerce, or decedents’ estates—issues largely
addressed at a state level.497 In 1907, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals looked to both
the District of Columbia and to Alaska, as well as to 30 Geo. 2 c. 24 (1757)—which
entered into common law before the United States even became a country—to reach a
conclusion.498 According to Milton J. Helmick, who served as a judge 1934-43, the
court subsequently “toyed for a time with the Alaska Code” before deciding to ground
its jurisprudence in the laws adopted by the District of Columbia.499
During the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II, Japan invaded and
occupied Shanghai.500 Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the U.S. declared
486
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war on Japan, prompting the latter to end concessions for Americans in Shanghai and
to imprison the judges of the court. In 1943, the United States signed a treaty with China
that gave up any extraterritorial rights and abolished the court.501 Five years later,
Congress formally repealed the statutory provisions.502
The U.S. Court for China provides special study in consular courts, as it is the only
one for whom appeal has been directly to an Article III court and whose judges have
enjoyed fixed terms (as aforementioned, 10 years). In 1956, Congress repealed its final
remaining extraterritorial privilege (in Morocco), thus ending the operation of federal
consular courts.503
B. Slavery and Land Claims
In addition to the traditional consular courts, Congress has established other courts
to implement treaty arrangements. In 1862, for example, the United States and Great
Britain agreed to take mutual steps to suppress the slave trade.504 Once again,
Congress’s power to legislate arose from Art. I(8)(3). The countries agreed that if either
country discovered a ship of the other country carrying slaves on the high seas, the cargo
would be subject to forfeiture proceeds before mixed claims courts, which would be
established by the two countries.505 There was no appeal from these courts.506 The court
was abolished in 1870.507
Pari passu, following the Mexican-American War, the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo required that the United States would respect land ownership rights established
by the Mexican government.508 During ratification, the Senate struck the provisions;
however, the United States assured Mexico that the land rights would be respected. 509
Following the failure of a number of land commissions established to survey the newlyacquired territory, in 1891 Congress created the Court of Private Land Claims.510 Five
judges, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, held five
year terms, with appeal from the court directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. Although it
was originally designed to complete its task in five years, the Court of Private Land
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Claims continued for thirteen years, in the course of which it ruled on title to more than
35 million acres of land.511
VI. COURTS OF OCCUPATION: ARTICLE II(1)
Like the courts addressed in Parts II-V, above, Article II courts derive from the
Constitution. But unlike Article III(1), I(8), and IV(3) entities, or Article II(2)/I(8)(3)
hybrids, pure Article II(1) courts of occupation do not require Congressional action prior
to being brought into being. They are created solely at the behest of the Executive.
Driven by duties entrusted to commissioned officers, they adhere to the Executive as an
aspect of conquest and expansion. They are unique to (1) land purchases prior to
Congressional establishment of territorial government, (2) armed rebellion, and (3) war
with foreign powers.
As a matter of Constitutional grounding, Article II(1), which establishes the
President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, provides the primary locus.512
To some extent, the authority for their creation can also be said to adhere to the
executive by nature of the sovereignty of the United States: occupation courts may be
integral to national integrity or to U.S. efforts to treat or to prosecute war with foreign
powers.513 Over the course of U.S. history, at least a dozen such entities have been
established, generally—but not solely—in the shadow of war.514 While most pre-date
the Civil War, at least four operated in the 20th century.515 In addition to the more
established occupation courts, numerous additional Article II(1) tribunals operated
during the U.S. Civil War on an informal basis, with little or no record of their
proceedings.516 Some are referred to as “provost courts,” because provost marshals, who
handle law enforcement matters within the military, serve as judges.517 Others are
created, and jurists appointed, at the direction of the individual responsible for
governance of the region. Yet others are a form of military commission that do not rely
on any, specific Congressional statute for their operation.
A. Land Acquisition
As an historical matter, some have been created as an interim step, prior to
Congressional establishment of territorial government. For example, following the
retrocession of what was to become the Louisiana territory from Spain to France, and
Napoleon Bonaparte’s accession, President Thomas Jefferson used the impending war
between Great Britain and France to negotiate the transfer of the French land in North
America to the United States. As part of the Louisiana Purchase, the offices of alcaldes,
who served as judges in criminal cases in Spanish audiencias, were abolished, leaving
no one vested with judicial authority. Accordingly, one of Governor William
Claiborne’s first actions in New-Orleans was to create a court of pleas, consisting of
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seven jurists with jurisdiction over certain civil and criminal matters.518 The court could
hear civil cases up to $3,000, with appeal for anything over $500 directly to the
governor.519 For criminal matters, the court had jurisdiction over all offenses for which
the punishment did not exceed 60 days’ imprisonment and a fine of $200.520 Anything
less than $100 could be decided by an individual jurist, with appeal to the court of
pleas.521
B. Armed Rebellion
Article II(I) courts also have been established in regions marked by violent civil
unrest and armed rebellion. Examples present both early on in U.S. history as well as
during the Civil War. While the courts established during the latter period bear many
hallmarks of military commissions in that they are constituted by the military and try
civilian violations of law, they can be distinguished from Article I(8)(10) and (11)
entities as a matter of process and substance. First, unlike the case with military
commissions, there is no explicit Congressional authorization for their creation. Instead,
they are informally created—and disbanded—at the will of military commanders.
Second, unlike military commissions, no declaration of war undergirds their formation.
Third, they introduce laws and rules outside of any action by a legislature that represents
those to whom the laws apply. Fourth, they purport to govern people within their
locality—that is, their jurisdiction extends to both military personnel and civilians
within a specified area.
Such courts have operated from the earliest days of the Republic. Recall that during
the Revolutionary War the colonies of East and West Florida stayed loyal to the
Crown.522 The 1783 Treaty of Paris returned them to Spain.523 In 1810, the settlers in
West Florida rebelled and declared independence.524 President James Madison asserted
that the portions of West Florida from the Mississippi to the Perdido rivers had been
acquired as part of the Louisiana Purchase, and negotiations commenced with Spain.525
In Spanish-controlled Florida, Seminole attacks within U.S. territories in late 1817
and 1818 led to the creation of occupation courts. In January 1818, Major James
Bankhead, the commanding officer in Fernandina (located on Amelia Island—and now
the northernmost city on the coast of Florida), issued an ordinance applying U.S. law
and installing two justices of the peace, to issue final decisions in cases involving claims
up to one hundred dollars.526 The justices were to investigate criminal cases and to
518

Id.
MARTIN, supra 516, at 238-239.
520 Id. at 239.
521
Id.
522 Acquisition of Florida: Treaty of Adams-Onis (1819) and Transcontinental Treaty (1821), OFF. OF THE
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/18011829/florida#:~:text=NOTE%20TO%20READERS,Acquisition%20of%20Florida%3A%20Treaty%20of%20Adams%2DOnis%20(1819),they%20returned
%20to%20Spanish%20control (last visited Jan. 7, 2021).
523 See id.; Definitive Treaty of Peace (Treaty of Paris), Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. II. Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80,
81-82.
524 Acquisition of Florida, supra note 522.
525 Id.
526 See Message from the President Transmitting Information Relative to the Occupancy of Amelia
Island, St. Marks, and Pensacola, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 15-117 (2d Sess.), at 9 (1819) (extract of a letter
from Major James Bankhead to J.C. Calhoun, Sec’y of War, Jan. 10, 1818), 10 (ordinance issued Jan. 5,
1818).
519

53

forward their opinions to the commanding officer, who had final authority in cases
affecting the life of the accused.527 To the commanding officer fell “all cases of riot, or
other disorders that may affect the peace and security” of the island.528 As a matter of
procedure, “[i]n all cases, particularly in matters of evidence, the usages and customs of
the United States” applied.529 At that point, conditions of war and unrest existed in the
territory, prompting John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, to support stringent
measures.530 Simultaneously, General Andrew Jackson pushed for U.S. invasion and
control of Pensacola—a goal accomplished in May 1818.531 Following conquest, in
February 1819, Spain agreed to cede the Floridas to the United States.532 Congress did
not ratify the Adam-Onis Treaty until 1821.533
In the interim, military officers immediately assumed the duties of civil magistrates.
The commission appointing the first governor, authorized Jackson “to exercise . . . all
the powers and authorities heretofore exercised by the Governor and Captain General
and Intendant of Cuba, and by the Governors of East and West Florida, within the said
provinces, respectively.”534 Jackson, accordingly, issued an order establishing county
courts comprised of five justices of the peace each.535 For civil cases, Spanish law
applied (outside of witness examination), while in criminal matters common law
applied.536 Premised on an indictment by a grand jury issued in the name of the United
States, the criminal trials themselves were public and held before a petit jury.537 Five
days after the first order establishing the court, the governor issued another ordinance
detailing the court’s rules of procedure and setting compensation rates for judicial
officers.538 The commissions for judges in West Florida were subsequently issued by
Secretary Adams.539
During the Civil War, myriad occupation courts similarly emerged as the Union
brought different regions under control. The authority to convene such tribunals
depended on rank—not on any particular appointment to the court.540 Many of these
courts were so informal that essentially no records of their proceedings are left.541 They
exercised criminal and, at times, civil jurisdiction. With no Congressional declaration
of war, or legislative framing for the courts or the rules they executed, these tribunals
arose solely at the behest of the executive. Applied to civilians in specified areas, they
527
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tried violations of law as defined by the occupying powers—an approach consistent
with traditional laws of war.
In 1862, for instance, multiple such courts marked New Orleans and its
surrounds.542 Immediately following capture of the city, Union forces established a
provost marshal’s court.543 It initially focused on more traditional matters related to
courts-martial matters: servicemembers and the laws of war. Soon, however, its
jurisdiction extended into the civilian realm to all criminal matters and most civil
causes.544 The military also revived former parish courts in the region.545 Many of the
judges had left prior to occupation, requiring Union forces to install new jurists.546 Some
civil courts, in addition, resumed operating in November 1862, with jurisdiction limited
to defendants in the parish of Orleans.547
All of these were local courts. To address the absence of any federal entities,
President Abraham Lincoln further created the United States Provisional Court for the
State of Louisiana. His authority to do so grew directly from the state of unrest that
marked the region. He explained, “The insurrection which has for some time prevailed
in several of the States of this Union, including Louisiana, [has] temporarily subverted
and swept away the civil institutions of that State, including the judiciary and the judicial
authorities of the Union.”548 This made it “indispensably necessary” to establish “some
judicial tribunal . . . capable of administering justice.”549 Lincoln’s Executive Order
establishing the court gave the judge sweeping authority
to hear, try, and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in
law, equity, revenue, and admiralty, and particularly all such powers and
jurisdiction as belong to the District and Circuit courts of the United States,
conforming his proceedings so far as possible to the course of proceedings and
practice which has been customary in the courts of the United States and
Louisiana; his judgment to be final and conclusive.550
The language indicated that the court would address all matters, both state and federal.
Lincoln went on to empower the judge “to make and establish such rules and regulations
as may be necessary for the exercise of his jurisdiction” and to empower him “to appoint
a prosecuting attorney, marshal, and clerk.”551 Appointment was at the pleasure of the
President and was limited to military occupation of the city of New Orleans and the
state.552 The court was to serve in an appellate capacity for civil cases outside of the
parish of Orleans. Throughout this time, Louisiana courts continued to operate behind
Confederate lines. To remedy the conflict, the judge of the Provisional Court merely
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ordered that all cases in confederate courts be brought before his court.553 Soon
thereafter, the military governor in the occupied region issued an order constituting a
new state Supreme Court.554
Similar courts have been created in other occupied areas, such as the Philippine
Islands, which the military ruled from the capture of Manila in 1898 until Congress
created a statutory framing in 1902.555 Similar experiences mark U.S. actions in Cuba
and Puerto Rico.556 As the Supreme Court of Tennessee observed in Rutledge v. Fogg,
a case upholding the decisions of a military occupation tribunal convened in Memphis,
Tennessee by a Union general, the right of a country to occupy and govern the territory
of another while in military possession of it flows from the fact of conquest and the laws
of war.557
The most recent example of the establishment of Article II courts in the midst of
armed rebellion and violence in U.S. territory is the imposition of martial law in Hawaii
during World War II. The Organic Act for the territory empowered the governor, “in
case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety
requires it,” to “suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Territory
or any part thereof, under martial law until communication can be had with the
President.”558 On December 7, 1941, Joseph Poindexter, the civilian territorial governor,
responded to the Pearl Harbor bombings by suspending the writ of habeas corpus and
relinquishing control of the territory to the U.S. Army commanding general, Walter C.
Short.559 For nearly three years, the civilian government was suspended. Throughout
that time, military courts operated.560 The Supreme Court later determined that the
provisions in the Organic Act that allowed for imposition of military rule did not
empower the armed forces to supplant all civilian laws when civilian government could
continue to function.561 “Courts and their procedural safeguards,” the Court wrote, “are
indispensable to our system of government. They were set up by our founders to protect
the liberties they valued.”562 As the system embraced “the antithesis of total military
rule,” the Court had no choice but to reject summary criminal trials by military tribunals.
The boundary between military and civilian power had to be carefully maintained.563
C. War with Foreign Powers
War with foreign powers provides a third context for the introduction of Article
II(1) tribunals. Occupation courts in this instance must comport with the law of
conquest, which (as a matter of international law) requires that conquering powers, to
the extent practicable, respect local custom and laws. Accordingly, in anticipation of
assimilating regions into the United States, the executive has consistently upheld local
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custom in the operation of occupation courts, modifying local rules and procedures to
the extent necessary to comport with U.S. constitutional norms.
The war between the United States and Mexico, declared in May 1846, for instance,
led to the establishment of Article II(1) occupation courts in New Mexico.564 These
tribunals derived from the President’s commander-in-chief authorities: Colonel (and
later Brigadier-General) Stephen W. Kearny’s orders, issued June 3, 1846, showed the
creation of the courts as an aspect of the military command and control process.565 While
eventually Congress might act to establish a civil territorial administration, in the
interim, the military was to create a government replete with judicial functions.566
The Kearny Code as implemented subsequently drew heavily from the Organic Law
provided for governing the Missouri Territory—reflecting the preparation of the
document by Colonel A.W. Doniphan, of the first regiment of Missouri mounted
volunteers.567 The judicial structure consisted of a superior (appellate) court, constituted
by three judges, and a number of lower (circuit) courts.568 The latter had jurisdiction
over all criminal cases not otherwise provided by law, and “exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil cases that were not cognizable before the prefects and
alcaldes.”569 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the validity of the system as it
operated until the territorial legislature explicitly adopted the orders and laws of the
provisional government, as well as the judicial decisions rendered by its courts.570
In the missive of June 1846, the President similarly directed General Kearny to gain
control in California.571 He was to work in concert with U.S. naval forces in the Pacific
to conquer the territory.572 As in New Mexico, the President instructed him to establish
civil government, leaving much to his discretion in doing so, such as “best to conciliate
the inhabitants, and render them friendly to the United States.”573 In reflection of
Kearny’s new responsibilities, W.L. Marcy, Secretary of War, conveyed a promotion in
rank upon him, to that of brevet brigadier general, as soon as he set forth for
California.574
In 1847, Commodore James Biddle, the naval commander in Monterey, created a
court to rule on prize vessels captured on the high sea.575 With the agreement of the
military governor of California, and (later) explicit Presidential authorization, Biddle
named a navy chaplain as judge.576 For matters on land, special tribunals were similarly
constituted, such as a court formed in 1847 in Sonoma to address criminal charges
564
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regarding the murder and kidnaping of Native Americans.577 The following year, a
similar court convened at Monterey.578 Absent a court of appeal, the governor
occasionally heard appellants. How they were treated, though, varied by the governor
in question: Governor Richard Mason, who served as the fifth military governor of
California, generally refused to hear an appeal if the case had already come before a
jury, whereas General Bennett Riley, who commanded the Military Department in
Upper California and acted as Provincial Governor 1849-50, in at least some cases
ordered a stay in execution until a higher court could be convened.579
The creation of these courts was considered an integral part of the prosecution of
war.580 During President James K. Polk’s annual message to Congress recognized the
United States’ “undisputed occupation” of New Mexico and the Californias, “all
resistance on the part of Mexico having ceased within their limits.”581 He argued for
their assimilation into the United States and called on Congress to establish territorial
governments as quickly as practicable over them.582 In the interim, the land was to be
“governed by our military and naval commanders under the general authority which is
conferred upon a conqueror by the laws of war.”583 During the subsequent debates in
Congress, members recognized the President’s plenary power to govern conquered
territory, subject only to international law: the Constitution did not apply to land outside
the United States.584
Article II(1) occupation courts do not just mark North American territory formerly
held by France, Spain, or Mexico. In the aftermath of World War II, for instance, three
courts were created to conduct matters in Germany and Japan. Under Law No. 2, the
United States suspended the German courts in the zone that it occupied, replacing them
with Military Government Courts.585 The Military Government asserted the authority to
dismiss or suspend any German judge or court official, to disbar any notary or lawyer,
to supervise and observe all judicial proceedings, to access all court documents and
records, to review all decisions of trial and appellate courts, and to nullify, suspend, or
modify any determination rendered by the courts.586 The occupation courts were
constituted by summary courts (for penalties of up to 1 year’s imprisonment and fines
up to $1,000), intermediate courts (for penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment and
fines not exceeding $10,000), and general courts (for penalties of any lawful sentence,
including capital cases).587 Their jurisdiction extended to all offenses committed by non-
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military personnel in the occupied area, trying matters linked to both German law and
legislation passed by the military government.588
The Rules of Practice for Military Government Courts reflected Anglo-American,
German, and courts-martial practices. All persons arrested were to be brought as soon
as practicable before a tribunal and apprised of the charges.589 During trial, defendants
could cross-examine witnesses and present their case.590 Certain fundamental rights,
mirroring those laid out in the U.S. constitution, would be afforded to defendants.591
The courts had exclusive criminal jurisdiction.592
The U.S. also created a Military Government Court for Civil Actions, consisting of
three members of the bar in good standing in one of the states or territories or the District
of Columbia of the United States.593 In 1949, the United States Courts of the Allied High
commission, operated by the U.S. State Department, replaced the Military Government
tribunals with civilian jurists.594 In addition to criminal matters, the court addressed all
cases in which servicemembers or their dependents, or civilian officials, were a party.595
These tribunals ended with the transfer of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of
Germany (West Germany).596 However, the United States maintained an occupation
regime within West Berlin.597 Thus, the United States Court for Berlin was established
in 1955.598 By the time it was abolished in 1990, however, it had only heard one case.599
The Treaty of Peace with Japan authorized the United States to exercise jurisdiction
over certain Japanese territories.600 In 1957, President Eisenhower issued an Executive
Order providing for a judicial system in the Ryukyu Islands modeled after that employed
in Puerto Rico.601 It provided for a local court with general jurisdiction over civil matters
and criminal jurisdiction related to Ryukyuans, as well as a second, Civil Administration
Court system, with trial and appellate tribunals.602 These entities had authority over any
case or controversy impacting U.S. property or interests, as well as cases to which U.S.
persons were party.603 The U.S. relinquished control of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972.604
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VII. ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
Administrative agencies house several adjudicatory bodies that are not considered part
of the federal judicial system. They are distinguished by the degree of independence
that they have from even the Executive. Their existence derives in significant measure
from the Progressive Era and the rapid proliferation of the administrative state.605 It
would be impossible to summarize all such entities: as of March 2017, more than 1,900
administrative law judges (ALJs) were serving in at least 27 adjudicatory bodies, with
their specific roles and responsibilities reflecting those of the agencies and departments
in which they were located.606
The largest of these entities, which rivals the size of the Bankrupcy Courts, is the
Social Security Administration (SSA), which houses nearly 85 percent of all ALJs.607
The SSA annually processes over 650,000 decisions at the hearing level.608 Like the
SSA, most administrative agency tribunals hold hearings, issue decisions or make
recommendations, and enforce agency regulations.609 Many of these decisions are
reviewable within an appellate structure within the agency, such as the SSA’s Appeals
Council. Often, the reviewing body consists of administrative appeals judges (AAJs).610
Similarly, by statute, the U.S. Tax court “is not an agency of, and shall be
independent of, the executive branch.”611 The line between the quasi-judicial functions
often undertaken by administrative agencies and the judicial matters that come before
Article I or Article III courts, though, is not always clear. In 1932, for example, the
Court allowed a private right (workers’ compensation) to be heard by an agency, while
still trying to preserve Article III courts’ role in determining questions of law, as well
as certain matters of fact.612 This case played a central role in the growth of the
administrative agencies.613
Entities discussed in Part III, above (i.e., specialized Article I(8) courts), are (a)
statutorily named a court of record; (b) explicitly established under Article I by statute;
or (c) stated by the Supreme Court or by the reviewing appellate court as being an
Article I court. In contrast, administrative tribunals do not fit any of these categories.614
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Some are themselves recognized as independent agencies within a department, with the
power to rule on decisions issued by other agencies.
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, for instance, created in
1970, rules on cases forwarded by the Department of Labor which relate to disputes
over the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s safety and health
inspections.615 The Executive Office for Immigration Review at the U.S. Department of
Justice administers the immigration court system. Once the Department of Homeland
Security charges an alien with violating immigration laws, EOIR determines whether
the person is removable and/or whether they qualify for relief.616 EOIR’s Office of the
Chief Immigration Judge has some 350 immigration judges who hold removal hearings
as well as other administrative proceedings in 60 immigration courts across the
country.617 The appellate entity, the Board of Immigration Appeals, hears appeals from
certain DHS determinations and immigration judge decisions, most of which involve
orders of removal or applications for relief. Certain orders are designated as
precedential, governing similarly-situated cases going forward.618 The EOIR also
includes an Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, which oversees cases
involving sanctions on employers for hiring unauthorized workers.619 The
Administrative Procedure Act sets the rules that govern administrative agencies, with
subsequent review of their decisions in Article III courts.620
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
For decades, scholars have wrestled with how Article I courts, in the absence of life
tenure during good behavior, undiminished compensation, and appointment with the
advice and consent of the Senate, could as a constitutional matter hear categories of
cases and controversies reserved to Article III. A handful have endorsed the theory of
appellate review: as long as cases can be adequately examined by an Article III court,
Congress has some leeway in the tribunals it erects.621 Others considered the operation
of Article I entities to be merely necessary.622
In 2004, Professor James Pfander offered instead a distinction rooted in the
constitutional text: between the inferior courts referenced in Article III and the inferior
tribunals of Article I, distinguishing them by, in the case of the former, the exercise of
the judicial power of the United States. He noted, as a condition for the latter, their
subservience to Article III. Pfander’s account is both persuasive and helpful; however,
it leaves open the question of how to think about courts that are neither Article I entities
nor subservient to the Supreme Court, such as territorial, consular, or occupation courts.
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In his narrow emphasis on the Article III/I divide, Pfander did not consider the
possibility that either Article IV or Article II might provide an alternative constitutional
locus. Of these, territorial courts have come in for their fair share of criticism.623 Perhaps
most recently, Professor William Baud has attempted to bridge the divide by suggesting
a distinction among courts based on the specific power being exercised: i.e., when
courts exercise an executive power, they are an Article I entity, whereas when they
exercise a judicial power, they must be understood as the judicial power of the sovereign
in question.624 Thus, states, tribal entities, and the federal government, as well as
territories, constitute separate governments, for which a judicial power can be exercised
in parallel with each other.
In some ways, Baud’s approach gets us further than Pfander, in that it accounts for
territorial entities. But it still does not address the existence of other federal tribunals,
such as consular courts, slave courts, extraterritorial entities, or courts of occupation.
When all federal courts are taken into account, a very different picture emerges—one
rooted in the Constitutional text.
As this Article has demonstrated, the federal judicial system, is comprised of general
and specialized Article III(1) courts that carry the judicial power of the United States
and, as such, constitute the third branch. It also includes specialized courts introduced
by Congress consistent with Article I(8)(9) and other enumerated powers, and
territorial courts derived from Article IV(3). In addition, it is constituted by treatybased extraterritorial courts rooted in both Article II(2) and Article I(8)(3) and courts
of occupation introduced by the President consistent with the Article II(2)
Commander-in-Chief authority. All of these tribunals have a constitutional nexus.
Many—but not all—of them are established by Congress. Many—but not all—of
them are inferior to the Supreme Court. Some—but not all of them—exercise the
judicial power of the United States. All of them adjudicate matters of law in ways that
impact the rights of U.S. citizens. It is time to jettison the prior models and adopt,
instead, a more robust understanding of the federal judicial system, grounded the
Constitutional text.
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